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Increasingly, firms need to develop strategies to cope with unanticipated events 
and challenges in a rapidly changing external environment. Whether a firm can keep up 
with a high-velocity, complex market is determined by whether it adopts appropriate 
marketing strategies. In my dissertation, I examine how firms can effectively use 
marketing to achieve strong financial performance in the presence of sweeping 
institutional changes.  
 In the first essay in my dissertation, I examine incumbent firms’ marketing mix 
responses to turbulence in their environment in the form of liberalization. Many 
governments are opening up their economies to foreign competition, with the expectation 
that it will increase economic growth. While foreign competitors with superior 
technology and management practices pose serious threats to incumbent firms, they also 
provide them an opportunity to gain new knowledge. In this essay, I explore the 
following two questions. First, how do incumbent firms, who have thus far operated in a 
highly protected market, respond to liberalization? Second, how do incumbent firms’ 
responses affect their performance? The findings suggest that incumbent firms’ 
knowledge significantly shapes their marketing mix responses to liberalization and that 
their performance outcomes are significantly affected by their marketing mix responses.  
 vii 
 In the second essay in my dissertation, I examine the effect of environmental 
turbulence in the form of CSR mandates on firms’ performance. While firms’ CSR 
initiatives have been traditionally considered voluntary, in an attempt to achieve inclusive 
development, some governments are enacting policy to encourage firms to engage in 
CSR initiatives. Can firms make strategic use of CSR mandates? CSR mandates affect 
two types of firms – those that were already engaging in CSR spending before the 
mandate (already-compliers), and those that are doing so for the first time (first-time 
compliers). The findings suggest that both already-compliers and first-time compliers can 
increase their shareholder value through their mandated CSR spending by increasing their 
advertising and research and development (R&D) spending. In addition, while already-
compliers can increase their shareholder value through their mandated CSR spending by 
introducing mechanisms to alleviate agency concerns, first-time compliers can do so by 
decreasing their promotion spending.  
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Chapter 1: The Effects of Liberalization on Incumbent Firms’ Marketing Mix 
Responses and Performance: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, several governments have liberalized, opening their domestic markets to 
foreign investment. Some have argued that liberalization of a market stimulates economic 
growth (Greenaway, Morgan, and Wright 2002). Yet, because of the superior technologies, 
products, and management practices of foreign firms, managers of incumbent firms worry that 
liberalization will hurt their firms’ performance (Roberts 2008). How do incumbent firms 
respond to the opening up of their markets through liberalization? In this research, we examine 
incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses to liberalization.  
From a theoretical perspective, a significant body of past work has examined firms’ 
responses to competition. Extant marketing literature on foreign competition studying the 
opening up of markets has examined the entry strategy of grocery retail firms into transition 
economies following liberalization (Gielens and Dekimpe 2007) and the entry of multinational 
firms into fast growing emerging markets (Johnson and Tellis 2008). From an incumbent firm 
perspective, extant research in marketing has examined the effect of new product introductions, 
short-term marketing attacks, and new domestic firm entry on incumbent firms’ marketing 
responses and performance (Golder and Tellis 1993; Shankar 1999; Steenkamp et al. 2005; 
Ailawadi et al. 2010, Mukherji et al. 2011). However, overlooked is how liberalization affects 
the marketing mix responses of incumbent firms. This is a surprising omission as liberalization 
represents a dramatic transition from a protected market to a more open, consumer-oriented 
market (Majumdar 1997), suggesting an important role for incumbent firms’ marketing mix 
responses. In addition, existing studies on incumbent firms’ responses have focused on a single 
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industry such as retail or banking, studying drivers and marketing mix responses specific to the 
industry in question, which raises the intriguing research question of what are the common 
factors that drive marketing mix responses of firms in different industries to liberalization? In 
Appendix A, we present an organizing framework and a summary of the related extant work 
respectively.  
Scholars in economics and international business have studied liberalization, focusing on 
the effects of liberalization on the performance of incumbent firms. Some studies report that 
liberalization improves incumbent firms’ performance (e.g., Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter 2007) 
through access to new knowledge, while others report that liberalization can hurt incumbent 
firms’ performance (e.g., Aitken and Harrison 1999; Kosová 2010). One reason for these 
conflicting findings is that incumbent firms may have differing marketing mix responses to 
liberalization which, in turn, may affect their performance. Yet, as we note above, incumbent 
firms’ marketing mix responses to liberalization have been overlooked in the literature.  
Crucially, while past research has examined firms’ marketing mix responses to domestic 
competition (Steenkamp et al. 2005; Ailawadi et al. 2010), from the perspective of incumbent 
firms, liberalization creates distinctive competitive characteristics with no comparable analog in 
domestic competition. First, following liberalization, incumbent firms, with experience in 
protected markets, may be disadvantaged relative to foreign entrants, with extensive experience 
in open markets (Hitt et al. 2000). Second, following liberalization, foreign entrants have more 
state-of-the-art, superior marketing and management practices (Grubaugh 1987; Morck and 
Yeung 1991) than in domestic competition. Thus, for incumbent firms, liberalization is a source 
of knowledge about superior marketing and management practices. In contrast to domestic 
competition, following liberalization, incumbent firms face heterogeneous competitors from 
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different countries. Finally, following liberalization, incumbent firms, relative to foreign 
entrants, have a distinctive advantage in terms of their knowledge of domestic institutions and 
market forces. Hence, it is unclear whether insights on incumbent firms’ marketing mix 
responses to domestic competition, the primary focus of past research, apply to liberalization.  
Thus, we examine incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses to liberalization and how 
their marketing mix responses, in turn, affect their performance? We consider the 4P’s of 
incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses - advertising, product mix, promotions, and 
distribution (van Waterschoot and van den Bulte 1992). We note that broadly there are two types 
of liberalization, trade liberalization that lower import duties to bring in cheaper products,  and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) liberalization by the removal of restrictions relating to encourage 
foreign firm entry in a market, each of which may have different effects on incumbent firms’ 
responses. In this research, we focus on the effects of FDI liberalization on incumbent firms’ 
marketing mix responses.  
The research’s findings also have high managerial relevance. Countries liberalize in a 
quest for economic growth, creating challenges for managers of incumbent firms, who are, 
naturally, concerned about the negative effects of liberalization. By studying the factors that 
influence incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses, and the effects of these responses on 
performance, we aim to arm managers of incumbent firms with insights on developing 
appropriate marketing mix responses to liberalization. Our findings suggest that incumbent firms 
can improve their performance following liberalization by as much as 30%, by suitably adjusting 
their marketing mix responses.   
Knowledge is a key asset, representing a source of sustainable competitive advantage for 
firms (Grant 1996; Mudambi and Swift 2012). Applying this idea, we propose that incumbent 
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firms’ knowledge plays a unique role in the context of liberalization. While incumbent firms 
have an advantage in terms of knowledge of domestic institutions and market forces, compared 
to foreign entrants, they are disadvantaged on their knowledge of superior management practices 
and experience of effectively operating in liberalized open markets. Anchoring our theoretical 
reasoning in the knowledge-based view of the firm (Grant 1996), we propose that the domestic 
market knowledge and foreign market knowledge of incumbent firms will influence their 
marketing mix responses (advertising, product mix, promotions, and distribution) to 
liberalization.  
To establish empirical identification of the effects of liberalization on incumbent firms’ 
marketing mix responses, we seek a context where the liberalization of the market is exogenous. 
One such context is India in 1991, where following a severe balance of payments crisis, the 
Indian government enacted FDI liberalization reforms. We use the exogenous variation in the 
FDI liberalization of Indian industries (some industries were liberalized to FDI, while others 
were not), to estimate the causal effect of liberalization on incumbent firms’ marketing mix 
responses using a difference-in-differences approach. We measure incumbent firms’ domestic 
market knowledge using their business group affiliation, and their foreign market knowledge 
using their foreign exchange earnings and spending. We then examine the effects of incumbent 
firms’ marketing mix responses on their performance, measured by their profitability. 
The results indicate that, on average, incumbent firms intensified their product mix and 
promotion responses to liberalization. Further, there is heterogeneity in incumbent firms’ 
marketing mix responses to liberalization, while incumbent firms with greater domestic market 
knowledge intensified their marketing mix responses to liberalization, incumbent firms with 
greater foreign market knowledge muted their marketing mix responses. Additional analysis of 
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the effects of incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses to liberalization on their performance 
indicates contingent effects, based on their domestic and foreign market knowledge.  
The study’s findings make four contributions to the extant literature. First, we extend the 
marketing response literature, which has primarily focused on firms’ responses to domestic 
competition, by generating insights on incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses to 
liberalization, an important and substantive context. Second, the extant marketing literature has 
primarily focused on how the size and financial capacity of incumbent firms affect their 
marketing mix responses and performance. By demonstrating the key role of incumbent firms’ 
knowledge on their marketing mix responses, we identify a novel driver of their response, 
domestic and foreign market knowledge. Third, we also contribute to the marketing literature by 
a comprehensive examination of four marketing mix variables - advertising, product mix, 
promotions, and distribution, which is driven in part, by our focus on the emerging market of 
India, and the resultant use of the Prowess database. In this regard we note that much of the 
extant research in marketing has focused on advertising and research and development (R&D)) 
spending, overlooking product mix, promotions, and distribution responses. Finally, this 
research’s findings also contribute to the economics and international business literature on 
liberalization, which has overlooked the marketing attributes of incumbent firms. 
For managerial practice, the integration of findings across incumbent firms’ marketing 
mix response and performance models indicates that a more intense marketing mix response 
following liberalization does not ensure superior performance. The specific pattern of findings 
generate actionable guidelines for managers of incumbent firms, based on their domestic and 
foreign market knowledge, facing liberalization. The findings are also useful to 1) managers of 
foreign firms entering liberalized markets to identify which incumbent firms will emerge as 
6 
 
strong competitors, 2) policymakers to help incumbent firms perform better following 
liberalization, thus achieving economic growth without hurting domestic firms, and 3) investors 
to identify incumbent firms for investment in newly liberalizing markets.  
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. We first present our conceptual framework 
and theory related to the effects of liberalization on incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses. 
We then discuss the data, method, and results. We conclude with a discussion of the paper’s 
theoretical contributions, implications for marketing practice, and limitations and opportunities 
for further research. 
1.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
We first provide an overview of liberalization and discuss how liberalization differs from 
domestic competition, the focus of most past research on competition in the marketing literature. 
Next, we discuss the related literature that may inform incumbent firms’ marketing mix 
responses to liberalization. Following that, using the knowledge-based view of the firm (Grant 
1996) as the theoretical anchor, we propose that incumbent firms’ domestic market knowledge 
and foreign market knowledge will influence their marketing mix responses to liberalization.  
1.2.1 Liberalization: A Brief Overview 
Liberalization intensifies competition in an industry, both by increasing the number of 
competitors and introducing new ways to compete in the marketplace (Blomstrom and Kokko 
2003; Driffield and Love 2007). Typically, during liberalization, the permitted level of foreign 
ownership of firms is increased to encourage foreign firm entry. If a foreign firm is already 
present in the market, liberalization provides the firm’s foreign owner, the opportunity to 
increase ownership and control over operations in the market (Chhibber and Majumdar 1999). 
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Following liberalization, most countries devote considerable attention and resources to 
attracting foreign firm investment (Kosová 2010). Liberalization is undertaken both in 
expectation of generating foreign exchange and jobs and, more importantly, to realize benefits to 
the economy by spillovers from foreign firms (Farole and Winkler 2012). These spillovers, 
include for example, improvements in domestic firms’ practices through diffusion of the superior 
management practices of foreign firms entering the market (Zhang, Li, and Li 2014). Further, 
through exposure to sophisticated foreign competitors, liberalization incentivizes domestic firms 
to acquire knowledge on efficient production techniques, innovative marketing and branding 
strategies, and novel product designs (Barkema and Drogendijk 2007).  
1.2.1.1 Key Differences between Liberalization and Domestic Competition 
Liberalization differs on multiple dimensions from domestic competition, the primary 
focus of past marketing scholarship (e.g., Debruyne and Reibstein 2005; Mukherji et al. 2011). 
First, when markets liberalize, incumbent firms, hitherto accustomed to operating in a protected 
market, experience a shock, as the market transitions from closed to more consumer-oriented 
(Aulakh, Kotabe, and Teegen 2000). Following liberalization, incumbent firms, with experience 
only in protected markets, may be disadvantaged relative to foreign entrants with experience in 
open markets (Hitt et al. 2000) as they may be unfamiliar with the strategies and practices of 
foreign firms entering the market following liberalization. Thus, compared to domestic 
competition, liberalization creates high uncertainty for incumbent firms. Second, foreign entrants 
following liberalization have superior marketing and management practices, and strengths in 
creating intangible assets i.e., brands and/or technologies (Morck and Yeung 1991) to which 
incumbent firms have little prior exposure. Thus, liberalization may be a source of substantial 
knowledge for incumbent firms who can learn more about new technologies, brand management, 
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and business processes from their foreign competitors (Banerjee et al. 2015) than may be 
possible from domestic competitors. Third, the foreign firms encountered by incumbent firms 
following liberalization typically originate from different countries (Zhang et al. 2010). Thus, 
following liberalization, there is considerable heterogeneity in competitors faced by incumbent 
firms. This is, in contrast to domestic competition where, by definition, competitors are from the 
local market. Finally, a competitive advantage for incumbent firms facing liberalization is their 
knowledge about domestic consumers, market forces, and institutions, which is less likely to be 
an advantage during domestic competition, where all firms have this local knowledge. 
1.2.2 Liberalization and Incumbent Firms’ Marketing Mix Responses  
Scholars in economics and international business have devoted considerable attention to 
identifying how liberalization affects incumbent firms’ performance (Aitken and Harrison 1999; 
Haskel, Perreira, and Slaughter 2007). Liberalization can improve incumbent firms’ performance 
by enabling domestic firms to acquire new knowledge from foreign firms (Spencer 2008). Yet, 
foreign firms can crowd incumbent firms out of markets for product, labor, and capital, causing 
them to lose market share or exit the industry altogether (Agosin and Machado 2005). Not 
surprisingly, therefore, there is mixed empirical evidence on how liberalization affects 
incumbent firms’ performance, which varies based on their size, financial strength, and 
technological capabilities (Blalock and Simon 2009; Eapen 2012). We contend that a more 
complete picture of the effects of liberalization on incumbent firms’ performance can be 
obtained by insights on the marketing mix responses of incumbent firms to liberalization, which 
prior research has hitherto overlooked.  
Marketing can improve firm performance by increasing brand equity, customer equity, 
and customer satisfaction (Ailawadi, Lehmann, and Neslin 2003; Fornell et al. 2006; Rust, 
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Lemon, and Zeithaml 2004), all of which can help incumbent firms compete against incoming 
foreign firms. In addition, foreign firms who enter a market following liberalization have strong 
intangible assets and marketing practices (Grubaugh 1987). Hence, incumbent firms may need to 
intensify marketing mix responses to counteract them. Liberalization alters demand patterns, 
highlighting the need for firms to deliver products and services valued by consumers (Day 1994). 
Thus, adopting appropriate marketing mix responses is crucial for incumbent firms to maintain 
strong performance following liberalization.  
1.2.3 Effect of Liberalization on Incumbent Firms’ Marketing Mix Responses  
Following liberalization, the market transitions from being protected to consumer-
oriented, progressively moving toward an open and competitive market system (Lora 1997). To 
counter the uncertainty of the changing environment, incumbent firms may respond by 
intensifying their marketing mix responses that is, the 4P’s – advertising, product mix, 
promotions, and distribution (van Waterschoot and van den Bulte 1992).  
Incumbent firms’ existing ties to trade partners, brand recognition, and knowledge of 
consumers, may be a competitive advantage not enjoyed by foreign entrants, following 
liberalization. To utilize this competitive advantage, incumbent firms may intensify their 
marketing mix responses, so they can deliver products valued by consumers and better cater to 
their preferences, which in turn, may help them retain consumers, maintain, and perhaps, even 
grow their sales and profits. 
Foreign firms who enter following liberalization, with their superior intangible assets and 
marketing practices (Grubaugh 1987; Morck and Yeung 1991), present a learning opportunity 
for incumbent firms. Any knowledge transfers from foreign firms to incumbent firms, through 
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imitation, forward and backward linkages with suppliers and distributors, and employee transfers 
(Spencer 2008) may cause incumbent firms to intensify their marketing mix responses.     
As foreign entry following liberalization typically entails local manufacturing by foreign 
firms, there may be significant local financial investment, signaling the long-term commitment 
of foreign firms to the market. Most foreign firms who enter following liberalization possess 
strong financial and managerial resources (Morck and Yeung 1991). Thus, incumbent firms may 
infer that foreign entrants will continue to operate in the market in the long-term even if their 
operations are not profitable in the short-term (Luoma et al. 2018). Given the seriousness of the 
competitive threat posed by foreign firms, incumbent firms may respond by intensifying their 
marketing mix responses.  
1.2.4 Incumbents’ Knowledge and their Marketing Mix Responses to Liberalization  
Firms compete not only through the creation, replication, and transfer of their own 
knowledge but also through their ability to absorb the knowledge of competitors (Zander and 
Kogut 1995). The ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external knowledge, assimilate 
it, and apply it to commercial ends is largely a function of its prior knowledge (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990). As liberalization results in the diffusion of superior management and marketing 
practices from foreign entrants to incumbent firms, we propose that incumbent firms’ existing 
knowledge will play an important role and that their marketing mix responses following 
liberalization (Meyer and Sinani 2009) will be influenced by their knowledge (which enhances 
their responsiveness and adaptability to institutional changes)(Grant 1996).  
When faced with liberalization, incumbent firms’ knowledge of domestic consumers, 
market forces, institutions, and trade partners represents a source of competitive advantage (Dau 
2013). Specifically, incumbent firms with greater domestic market knowledge are better situated 
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to absorb superior management and marketing practices from foreign entrants (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990). Likewise, incumbent firms’ prior knowledge of foreign markets, firms, and 
consumers may help them assess the threat posed by the foreign firms, understand the marketing 
actions of foreign firms, and choose appropriate marketing mix responses to liberalization. Thus, 
we propose that incumbent firms’ domestic and foreign market knowledge (Mitra and Golder 
2002; Banerjee et al. 2015) will influence their marketing mix responses to liberalization. We 
present the conceptual framework in Figure 1.1.  
---- Insert Figure 1.1 here ---- 
1.2.5 Domestic Market Knowledge and Incumbent Firms’ Marketing Mix Responses  
Incumbent firms with greater domestic market knowledge may have accumulated 
knowledge of the tastes and preferences of domestic consumers and practices of domestic trade 
partners (Thornhill and Amit 2003), a competitive advantage relative to foreign entrants, which 
they may leverage to better address the market’s needs by intensifying their marketing mix 
responses.  
Such domestic market knowledge may create a synergistic effect, enabling incumbent 
firms to learn quickly from foreign firms (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Hence, we propose that 
incumbent firms’ existing knowledge may enable them to absorb superior marketing practices 
from incoming foreign firms (Spencer 2008), so that incumbent firms with greater domestic 
market knowledge may imitate foreign entrants who are, generally, much stronger in marketing, 
intensifying their marketing mix responses.  
As incumbent firms with greater domestic knowledge have superior knowledge of 
domestic institutions and market forces (Mitra and Golder 2002), they may be aware of the 
competitive threat posed by foreign entrants following liberalization and respond to this threat by 
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intensifying their marketing mix responses. Finally, firms perceive competitors with similar 
resources and capabilities as relevant threats (Chen 1996). Following liberalization, incumbent 
firms with greater domestic market knowledge may consider incoming foreign firms as their 
natural competitors, and may respond by intensifying their marketing mix responses.  
1.2.6 Foreign Market Knowledge and Incumbent Firms’ Marketing Mix Responses  
Incumbent firms with greater foreign market knowledge may have prior insights into the 
marketing practices of foreign firms. Through their ties with economic actors in foreign markets 
(e.g. importers, exporters, trade partners, buyers, competitors, and governments), firms with 
greater foreign market knowledge can learn about more efficient product designs and marketing 
strategies deployed by foreign firms (Eriksson et al. 1997). Foreign market knowledge may 
allow incumbent firms to absorb new knowledge from foreign entrants and imitate their 
practices, which may result in intensification of their marketing mix responses. Further, foreign 
market knowledge may increase incumbent firms’ awareness of the superiority of foreign firms, 
causing them to perceive foreign entrants as strong threats and intensify their marketing mix 
responses.  
At the same time, as incumbent firms with greater foreign market knowledge may have 
competed with foreign firms in other markets, they may have already increased their marketing 
to attract foreign buyers and may not intensify their marketing mix responses to liberalization. 
Further, the knowledge gap between incumbent firms with foreign market knowledge and 
foreign entrants on marketing practices may not be large, so that liberalization may not provide a 
strong learning opportunity for them (Meyer and Sinani 2009). Thus, incumbent firms with 
greater foreign market knowledge may mute their marketing mix responses to liberalization.  
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Summary. Developments in extant theory suggests that liberalization creates uncertainty 
and turbulence for incumbent firms, as well as an opportunity to learn superior management and 
marketing practices from incoming foreign firms, to which they may respond by adjusting their 
marketing mix. Incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses may be influenced by their extant 
knowledge, specifically, their domestic market knowledge and foreign market knowledge. While 
incumbent firms’ domestic market knowledge may cause them to intensify their marketing mix 
responses, the extant literature provides competing predictions on how incumbent firms’ foreign 
market knowledge may influence their marketing mix responses. 
1.3 METHOD 
1.3.1 Identification Strategy  
A key concern for estimating the effects of liberalization on incumbent firms’ marketing 
mix responses is endogeneity, which can arise from two primary sources, reverse causality and 
omitted variables. Reverse causality may occur if incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses 
erect strategic barriers, discouraging foreign firms from performing effectively in the market that 
they have entered. Alternatively, omitted variables can be a source of endogeneity, as foreign 
firms may enter markets with high growth prospects or weak incumbent firms. As the inclusion 
of firm-level controls and firm-fixed effects may not capture all sources of endogeneity, we seek 
a context with an exogenous shock of liberalization, which provides a quasi-experimental setting. 
One such context, which provides an institutional setting to make robust inferences, is India’s 
FDI liberalization reform in 1991, which we describe below.  
1.3.2 Empirical Context  
Before 1991, the Indian government had a protectionist, inward-focused economic 
policy. In early 1991, various macroeconomic developments including deficits, increase in oil 
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prices, and political uncertainty led to a balance-of-payments crisis in the Indian economy. To 
manage this economic crisis, the Indian government sought financial assistance from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), which offered support conditional on the implementation of 
liberalization reforms that would integrate the Indian economy with the global economy 
(Topalova and Khandelwal 2011). In response, the Indian government enacted FDI liberalization 
reforms in August 1991. FDI liberalization entailed the reduction of foreign direct investment 
barriers i.e. the percentage of FDI equity allowed was increased from 40% to 51% in 46 of the 
129 primary industry categories defined according to a three-digit industrial code (Office of the 
Economic Advisor, 2001). In the remaining industries, the limit on FDI equity remained at 40% 
and foreign investors had to obtain approval from the Indian Government to increase their 
investment above 40%. FDI inflows dramatically increased after liberalization. The stock of FDI 
in India increased from less than US$ 155 million in 1991 to US$ 586 million by 1993(Nagaraj 
2003).  
 To eliminate political opposition to the FDI liberalization reform, the Indian parliament 
enacted the reform without much debate, creating an exogenous shock for incumbent firms. As 
Dr. Chelliah, a member of the Planning Commission (the body responsible for the reform) noted 
“When we started economic reforms in 1991….we didn’t have time to sit down and think exactly 
what kind of a development model we needed…there was no systematic attempt to see two 
things: one, how have the benefits of reforms distributed, and two, ultimately what kind of 
society we want to have, what model of development should we have?” (Warrier 2004). 
Supporting the view that the liberalization reform in India in 1991 was an exogenous shock, we 
note that it has been used as a quasi-experimental setting in studies in economics (Aghion et al. 
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2008; Topalova and Khandelwal 2011; De Loecker et al. 2016) and finance (Alfaro and Chari 
2014).  
Hence, we exploit the exogenous shock of FDI liberalization reforms in India in 1991 to 
estimate the causal effects of liberalization on incumbent firms. The exogenous FDI 
liberalization reform offers three advantages with respect to estimation. First, it enables us to 
alleviate concerns resulting from endogeneity. As the FDI liberalization reform was sudden and 
unanticipated, there was no time for firms to lobby for or against it, precluding concerns of 
reverse causality. Further, the presence of restrictive policies related to foreign competition 
before the reform prevents an unobserved variable (e.g., the firm’s intention to compete with 
foreign firms) from influencing the key explanatory variables (domestic and foreign market 
knowledge) and dependent variables (marketing mix responses). Specifically, the sudden and 
unanticipated removal of restrictions in 1991 significantly reduces the likelihood that incumbent 
firms intended to compete with foreign firms and thus reduces the likelihood that they acquired 
domestic or foreign market knowledge that would help them compete against foreign firms. 
Second, the reform enables us to study incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses from the first 
time the market was liberalized. While FDI liberalization changes happened in developed 
markets several decades ago, and so are difficult to study, they are easier to study in India as FDI 
liberalization happened in the recent past. Finally, the quasi-experimental setting of the FDI 
liberalization reform in India (i.e. by which some but not other industries were liberalized to 
FDI) enables us to account for other macroeconomic factors that may affect incumbent firms’ 
marketing mix responses. In doing so, we are able to isolate the causal effect of liberalization on 
the marketing mix responses of incumbent firms (Vig 2013) and the contingent effects of 
incumbent firms’ knowledge on their marketing mix responses during liberalization.  
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 Exogeneity of the FDI Liberalization Shock. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1991 
(Office of the Economic Advisor, 2001) provides the list of industries which were liberalized to 
FDI. We empirically confirm the exogeneity of FDI liberalization in India using kernel density 
plots of firm characteristics (i.e., assets, profitability and sales) (Figure B1 of Appendix B) in 
industries which were liberalized (vs. not). The kernel density plots indicate that the distribution 
of firm characteristics is largely similar across the two groups, before FDI liberalization. In 
addition, in Table B1 of Appendix B, we report t-tests comparing average values of key variables 
across liberalized and un-liberalized industries before FDI liberalization in 1991, and find no 
significant differences. 
1.3.3 Data  
We use data on Indian publicly-listed incumbent firms from the Prowess Database of the 
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) to examine the effects of liberalization on 
incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses. Firms in this database account for 75% of all 
corporate taxes and more than 95% of excise duties collected by the Indian government. We 
collect data on both incumbent and foreign firms’ advertising, promotions, and distribution 
spending, number of products, group membership, foreign exchange earnings, foreign exchange 
spending, total assets, total sales, and profit before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) between 1988 and 2000. We provide details of the marketing data classification by 
Prowess in the Appendix C. The first year from which data is available in the Prowess database 
is 1988, as we lose one year because of lagging explanatory variables, the final sample spans an 
twelve-year period (1989 – 2000). Our results are robust to using 1999 or 1998 as the final year 
for analysis, as we detail further in the additional analyses and robustness checks section below.  
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After excluding observations of incumbent firms 1) incorporated after 1991, 2) where 
asset information is missing, 3) for which the reporting period is not 12 months, 4) from 
industries with fewer than two firms, and losing one year of observations due to lagged variables, 
we have a sample of 16,633 firm-year observations for estimation. We describe the constructs, 
measures, and data sources in Table 1.1.  
---- Insert Table 1.1 here---- 
 
1.3.4 Measures  
Liberalization. The liberalization variable is coded as 1 for firms in industries that were 
liberalized to FDI, and 0 for firms in industries that were not liberalized to FDI (M = .467, SD = 
.499). As the FDI liberalization policy was implemented at the three-digit National Industrial 
classification (NIC) level, we compute this variable at this level.  
Post. We code the Post variable as 1 for firm-year observations after FDI liberalization in 
1991 and 0 for those before FDI liberalization (M = .894, SD = .308).  
Marketing Mix Responses. Advertising represents the firm’s spending on media. To 
exclude any scale effects of firm size, we scale advertising spending (and other spending 
measures below) by the firm’s total assets (M = .010, SD = .025). Product mix represents the 
diversity in the firm’s product portfolio, which we obtain from firms’ annual reports (Indian 
firms are required by the Companies Act of 1956 to disclose product-level information in their 
annual reports).  
We measure the firm’s product mix by the number of products reported by the firm in a 
given year (M = 4.573, SD = 4.429). Promotions represents a firm’s spending on rebates, 
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discounts, and sales promotions (M = .021, SD = .038). Distribution represents a firm’s spending 
to deliver products to various channel intermediaries including retailers, wholesalers, and 
distributors, including on consignment and loss of goods in transit (M = .026, SD = .040). 
Domestic Market Knowledge. We measure a firm’s domestic market knowledge using its 
business group affiliation. Firms affiliated with business groups have cross-shareholding and 
inter-locking directorates, which facilitate knowledge sharing between business group firms 
(Banerjee et al. 2015). Typically, within business groups, there is a core administration (Yiu et 
al. 2007) responsible for sharing information on domestic markets. Prowess classifies firms as 
belonging to business groups or not, using a variety of sources to classify firms into various 
ownership groups based on continuous monitoring of firm shareholding, new announcements, 
and a qualitative understanding of the group-wise behaviors of individual firms (Chittoor et al. 
2015). Following prior research using this classification (Khanna and Palepu 2000; Chacar and 
Vissa 2005), we code the domestic market knowledge variable as 1 if the firm belongs to a 
business group and 0 otherwise (M = .498, SD = .500). 
Foreign Market Knowledge. Extant research (MacGarvie 2006; Goldberg et al. 2009; 
Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl 2015) suggests that firms can gain experience of foreign sellers by 
buying imported inputs from them, and can gain knowledge about foreign buyers’ practices and 
processes by exporting to them ( Leonidou and Kaleka 1998; Theodosiou and Katsikea 2013). 
Thus, we operationalize a firm’s foreign market knowledge using a sum of two measures – 1) 
foreign exchange spending, which includes a firm’s spending on import of raw materials, import 
of stores and spares, import of finished goods, import of capital goods, and forex spending on 
royalties and technical knowhow, and 2) foreign exchange earnings, which includes earnings 
from export of goods, export of services, and deemed export. To arrive at our measure of foreign 
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market knowledge, we take the sum of these two measures, and scale it using the firm’s total 
assets (M = .146, SD = .313). For missing values of foreign exchange spending and foreign 
exchange earnings, we impute values to .0001 before computing the sum.  
Control Variables. As a firm’s size and its profitability may affect its marketing mix 
responses, we control for the firm’s size by its total assets (M = 73.074 USD Million, SD = 
396.089 USD Million), and for the firm’s profitability by its return on assets, EBITDA/ Total 
assets (M = .116, SD = .129). We also control for the domestic competition in a firm’s industry, 
by accounting for the relative participation of domestic firms in an industry, using the cumulative 
market share of all domestic firms in the industry (M = .855, SD = .148). We lag all control 
variables by one year, with the exception of domestic competition, which is contemporaneous. 
We provide the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of all variables, winsorized at 0.25%, 
in Table 1.2.  
---- Insert Table 1.2 here ---- 
1.3.5 Estimation Approach – Difference-in-differences   
A quasi-experiment is defined as a naturally occurring contrast between a treatment and a 
comparison condition in which the cause usually cannot be manipulated (Cook, Campbell, and 
Shadish 2002). We argue that a quasi-experiment occurred during the time of FDI liberalization 
in India because of an exogenous event: the FDI liberalization of some Indian industries but not 
others. As a result of FDI liberalization, there was a natural treatment group (firms in industries 
liberalized to FDI) and a control group (firms in unliberalized industries), using which we can 
measure the causal effect of liberalization. 
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We examine the effects of liberalization on incumbent firms using the Difference-in-
Differences method, which is well-suited to establishing causal claims in a quasi-experiment 
(Chari and Henry 2004; Vig 2013). The difference-in-differences method compares the effect of 
the event (in this case, FDI liberalization) on groups that are liberalized to FDI (the treatment 
group) with those which are not (the control group). To understand the effect of liberalization on 
incumbent firm’s marketing mix responses, we subtract the average value of the marketing 
response before the event from the average value of the marketing response after the event. 
However, other factors might have changed as well. Hence, we use incumbent firms in the 
control group to account for any other observable or unobservable factors.  
We provide model-free evidence, which provides the intuition behind our empirical 
approach. We divide incumbent firms into two groups, liberalized firms, the treatment group and 
un-liberalized firms, the control group. We examine two periods – pre (before FDI liberalization 
in 1991) and post (after FDI liberalization in 1991). We take the difference for the firms in the 
liberalized group pre and post liberalization for each marketing response variable, by collapsing 
to averages for each period. Similarly, we take the difference for the firms in the un-liberalized 
group, and compute the difference between these two differences to arrive at the difference-in-
differences estimate. The model-free evidence suggests, that in response to liberalization, 
incumbent firms intensified their product mix (b = .617, p<.01) and promotions (b=.003, p<.05), 
but not their advertising and distribution.    
To estimate the difference-in-differences model, we regress the incumbent firm’s 
marketing response on the interaction of Liberalization and Post variables and the control 
variables. We control for unobserved heterogeneity using firm-fixed-effects, and for any effects 
of time using year-fixed-effects. 
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𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚′𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0𝑖 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛼3[𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡] + 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼6𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                             (1) 
where 𝛼0𝑖 represents the firm-fixed-effect, 𝛼3 represents the causal effect of  liberalization on 
incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses, 𝛾𝑡 represents the year-fixed-effects. We estimate 
four such equations for each marketing response of incumbent firms – advertising, product mix, 
promotions, and distribution.  
         We exploit the cross sectional variation in the treatment and control groups to estimate 
the heterogeneous treatment effects of liberalization on incumbent firms’ marketing mix 
responses contingent on their domestic market knowledge and foreign market knowledge (Vig 
2013). This specification enables us to examine the effects of knowledge on incumbent firms’ 
marketing mix responses in liberalized industries (vs those in un-liberalized industries) following 
liberalization. Thus, the estimation approach eliminates concerns of endogeneity that an 
unobserved variable may influence both the dependent variable and independent variables.  
              Thus, we estimate the following model  
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠′𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1[𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡] + 𝛽2[𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡] + 𝛽3[𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡] +
𝛽4[𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡] + 𝛽5[𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡] + 𝛽6[𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡] +
𝛽7[𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡] + 𝛽8𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽10𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
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𝛽13𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽14𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                             
(2) 
where i is the subscript for the firm and t is the subscript for the year, 𝛽0𝑖 refers to the 
firm-fixed-effect, and 𝛾𝑡 represents the year-fixed-effects, 𝛽1 refers to the heterogeneous 
treatment effect of liberalization on incumbent firms with domestic market knowledge, and 𝛽2 
refers to the heterogeneous treatment effect of liberalization on incumbent firms with foreign 
market knowledge.   
1.4 RESULTS 
We first estimated the difference-in-differences model without the control variables, followed by 
with the inclusion of the control variables. We present the results of the difference-in-differences 
model without the control variables in Column 1-4 of Panel A in Table 1.3. While liberalization 
did not affect incumbent firms’ advertising (b = -.045, not significant (n.s.)), incumbent firms 
intensified their product mix (b = 27.2, p<.01), promotions (b = .178, p<.05), and distribution (b 
= .215, p<.01) in response to liberalization.  
 We present the results of the difference-in-differences model including controls in 
Column 1-4 of Panel B in Table 1.3. While liberalization did not affect incumbent firms’ 
advertising (b = .003, n.s.) and distribution (b = .079, n.s.), incumbent firms intensified their 
product mix (b = 24.7, p<.01) and promotions (b = .322, p<.01) in response to liberalization.  
 In Column 1-4 of Panel C of Table 1.3, we present the results of the heterogeneous 
treatment effects model, including the effects of incumbent firms’ domestic market knowledge 
and foreign market knowledge. These results suggest that incumbent firms with greater domestic 
market knowledge are more likely to intensify their advertising (b = .003, p<.05), product mix (b 
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= .323, p<.10), promotions (b = .005, p<.05), and distribution (b = .004, p<.10), in response to 
liberalization. 
 Incumbent firms with greater foreign market knowledge are less likely to intensify their 
promotions (b = -.008, p<.05) and distribution (b = -.009, p<.01) in response to liberalization. 
However, liberalization has no effect on the advertising (b = .003, n.s.) and product mix (b = -
.081, n.s.) of incumbent firms with greater foreign market knowledge.  
 Next, we discuss the effects of the control variables. Firm size has a positive effect on 
incumbent firms’ product mix (b = 16.4, p<.01) and a negative effect on their promotions (b = -
.041, p<.05). Firm profitability has a positive effect on incumbent firms’ advertising (b = .006, 
p<.01), promotions (b = .010, p<.01), and distribution (b = .010, p<.01), while domestic 
competition does not affect incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses.  
Summary of Results. We provide a summary of results across the difference-in-
differences model and heterogeneous treatment effects model in Table 1.4. The results of the 
difference-in-differences model suggest that incumbent firms intensified their product mix and 
promotions in response to liberalization. The results of the heterogeneous treatment effects 
model suggest that while incumbent firms with greater domestic market knowledge intensified 
their marketing mix responses to liberalization, incumbent firms with greater foreign market 
knowledge muted their marketing mix responses to liberalization. We next report on additional 
analysis that examine the robustness of the results. 
----Insert Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 here---- 
1.4.1 Additional Analyses and Robustness Checks  
Reduction in Trade Tariffs. In addition to FDI liberalization, in 1991, the Indian 
government also liberalized trade by decreasing trade tariffs in some manufacturing industries.  
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Import tariffs for products are reduced during trade liberalization to increase the attractiveness of 
the market for foreign firms to sell their products (manufactured outside). Trade liberalization 
can increase dumping and predatory price-based competition (Irwin 2005). To establish that the 
results are robust to concurrent reduction in trade tariffs, we control for the reduction in trade 
tariffs across industries in the estimated model, using an indicator variable coded as 1 if the 
incumbent firm’s industry had reduced tariffs in 1991 (0 if not). We present the results of this 
estimation in Panel A of Table 1.5, which are consistent with those in Table 1.3. 
 Controls for Number of Foreign Firms. Incumbent firms in industries where there were 
greater number of foreign entrants may be more motivated to intensify their marketing mix 
responses. To rule out this alternative explanation, we re-estimate the model by controlling for 
the number of foreign firms in an industry. We present these results in Panel B of Table 1.5, 
which are consistent with those in Table 1.3.  
Controls for Foreign Firms’ Marketing. Incumbent firms’ marketing responses to 
liberalization may be influenced by the marketing actions of foreign entrants. Thus, we re-
estimate the models by controlling for foreign firms’ advertising in an industry by dividing the 
average advertising intensity of foreign firms by the average advertising intensity of all firms in 
the industry, in the equation for incumbent firms’ advertising responses. Similarly, we re-
estimate the models by controlling for foreign firms’ products, promotions, and distribution in 
each of the corresponding equations. We present these results in Table D1 of Appendix D, which 
are consistent with those in Table 1.3.  
Controls for Industry Concentration and R&D Intensity. Incumbent firms in industries 
with lower industry concentration and those with greater R&D intensity may be more motivated 
to intensify their marketing responses to liberalization. To rule out these alternative explanations, 
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we re-estimate the model including industry concentration and R&D intensity as controls1. We 
present the results of this estimation in Table D2 of Appendix D, which are consistent with those 
in Table 1.3.  
Industry Fixed Effects. To rule out that industry effects are driving the estimation results, 
we re-estimate the model with the inclusion of industry fixed effects interacted with the Post 
variable. We present these results in Table D3 of Appendix D, which are consistent with those in 
Table 1.3.  
Excluding Observations from 1999 and 2000. To ensure that our results are robust across 
different samples, and that they are robust to different choices for the final year of analysis, we 
re-estimate the model excluding observations belonging to the year 2000. We present these 
results in Table D4 of Appendix D, which are consistent with those in Table 1.3. Next, we re-
estimate the model excluding observations belonging to the year 2000 and 1999, and present 
these results in Table D5 of Appendix D, which are consistent with those in Table 1.3.  
Winsorizing. To ensure that our results are robust to different levels of winsorizing, we 
re-estimate the model by winsorizing the variables at 0.5% instead of 0.25%. We present the 
results of this estimation in Table D6 of Appendix D, which are consistent with those in Table 
1.3.  
1.5 INCUMBENT FIRMS’ MARKETING MIX RESPONSES AND PERFORMANCE  
We next examine the effects of incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses on their 
performance to generate insights on whether their responses to liberalization helped or hurt their 
performance.  
                                                 
1 As few firms report R&D spending, we impute a value of .0001 for missing values of R&D spending.  
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We estimate a model where the dependent variable is incumbent firms’ profitability and 
the key independent variables are their advertising, product mix, promotions, and distribution 
responses to the liberalization. As incumbent firms’ marketing in the current period may be 
affected by liberalization, we lag all marketing response variables by one year. We measure the 
extent of FDI competition faced by an incumbent firm using the cumulative market share of all 
foreign firms in the industry.  
We estimate a model including all three-way interactions of incumbent firms’ marketing 
mix responses and FDI competition with the two moderators from the first stage – domestic 
market knowledge and foreign market knowledge. We control for unobserved heterogeneity 
using firm-fixed-effects, and for annual changes using year-fixed-effects. To control for any 
industry-level changes in the performance of incumbent firms after liberalization, we include the 
interaction term between the variable Post and industry dummies, in the model. Similar to the 
estimation of incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses, we control for firm size, firm 
profitability, and domestic competition.  
 We present the performance model in Table 1.6. We present a comparison of incumbent 
firms’ marketing mix responses with the effect of their marketing response on performance 
(using the directionality of the three-way interactions) in Table 1.7. Below, we discuss the 
convergence and divergence between incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses and appropriate 
marketing mix responses as indicated by the parameter estimates of the three-way interaction 
terms in the performance model. We discuss the implications of these insights in the managerial 
implications section.  
---- Insert Tables 1.6 and 1.7 here ---- 
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1.5.1 Domestic Market Knowledge  
The results of the marketing response model in Table 1.3 indicate that incumbent firms 
with greater domestic market knowledge intensified their advertising, product mix, promotions, 
and distribution in response to liberalization. The results of the performance model (Table 1.6 
and Table 1.7) indicate that this was partially the appropriate strategy for them, as their 
distribution (b = 1.602, p<.10) responses improve their performance. However, the results of the 
performance model indicate that for incumbent firms with greater domestic market knowledge, 
their advertising (b = -.714, n.s.), product mix (-.008, n.s.), and promotions (b = -.617, n.s.) 
responses which they intensified, did not improve performance following liberalization, 
suggesting opportunities for them to improve performance.  
1.5.2 Foreign Market Knowledge  
While the results of the marketing response model (Table 1.3) indicate that incumbent 
firms with greater foreign market knowledge muted their promotions and distribution responses 
to liberalization, the performance model (Table 1.6 and Table 1.7) indicates that this was 
partially the appropriate strategy for them to follow, as decreasing their distribution responses (b 
= -2.237, p<.01) improves performance, but increasing their promotions responses (b = 1.692, 
p<.05) also can improve performance, suggesting opportunities for them to improve 
performance.   
1.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION  
Several markets are liberalizing, transitioning from protected markets to open markets. 
These transitions are disruptive, dramatically affecting the competitive environments faced by 
incumbent firms in these markets, suggesting a key role for their marketing mix responses on 
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their performance. Yet, there are few insights on incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses to 
liberalization.   
Addressing this research gap, we theorize and find that the market knowledge of 
incumbent firms influences their marketing mix responses to liberalization. We exploit a quasi-
experiment, the liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991, to causally identify the effects of 
liberalization on incumbent firms. We conclude with a discussion of the findings’ contributions 
to theory, implications for managerial practice, and the limitations and opportunities for further 
research.  
1.6.1 Theoretical Contributions  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the marketing mix 
responses of incumbent firms to liberalization. Through this study, we contribute to the 
marketing literature on competitive response, which has thus far, focused on domestic 
competition (Ailawadi et al. 2010; Mukherji et al. 2011). Prior research on domestic competition 
suggests that no marketing response maybe the most common response for incumbent firms 
(Steenkamp et al. 2005; Ailawadi et al. 2010). However, by studying a new type of competition, 
this study’s findings indicate that incumbent firms do respond aggressively through their 
marketing to liberalization that, in turn, affects their performance.   
Second, through our study, we extend the literature on marketing mix responses and 
liberalization in a novel way. Extant research has focused on incumbent firms’ size and financial 
capacity as drivers of their response and performance during domestic competition and  
liberalization (Ailawadi et al. 2010, Zhang et al. 2010, Mukherji et al. 2011), but has ignored 
incumbent firms’ knowledge, a formidable source of competitive advantage. We show that 
incumbent firms’ knowledge can help explain the marketing mix responses of incumbent firms 
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to liberalization, and subsequent performance. We examine two different types of market 
knowledge – domestic market knowledge and foreign market knowledge. Our findings 
demonstrate that different types of knowledge, including domestic market knowledge and 
foreign market knowledge, differentially affect both incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses 
and performance following liberalization. Thus, through our study we add a new angle to the 
literature on liberalization and competitive response, demonstrating that incumbent firms’ 
knowledge must be accounted for when studying the effects of competition.  
Third, much of the marketing literature has focused on the effect of advertising and R&D 
on firm performance (Srinivasan, Lilien, and Sridhar 2011). By studying the effect of four 
different types of marketing – advertising, product mix, promotions, and distribution on firm 
performance, we contribute to the literature on the effects of marketing mix elements. Extant 
studies on marketing mix responses primarily examine a single marketing variable such as 
advertising or product mix (Mukherji et al. 2011), or study industry specific marketing mix 
responses, such as product assortment in the retailing industry (Ailawadi et al. 2010). By 
studying all 4P’s of the marketing mix, we are able to more comprehensively understand, and 
develop a fuller picture of incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses to competition.   
Finally, through our study, we contribute to the international business and economics 
literature, where there is mixed evidence on the effects of liberalization on incumbent firms’ 
performance (e.g., Aitken and Harrison 1999; Kosová 2010). By demonstrating that incumbent 
firms respond through their marketing to liberalization, which in turn, affects their performance, 
we help clarify the mixed evidence on the effects of liberalization on incumbent firms. 
Specifically, while some incumbent firms benefit by intensifying marketing mix responses to 
liberalization, others benefit by de-intensifying certain marketing mix responses. Thus, through 
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our study, we add a new angle to the literature on liberalization, demonstrating that incumbent 
firms’ marketing mix responses are a key determinant of their performance that must be 
accounted for when studying the effects of liberalization on incumbent firms.  
1.6.2 Managerial Implications   
The findings have implications for managers of incumbent firms facing liberalization, 
managers of foreign entrants, policymakers, and investors. 
1.6.2.1 Managers of Incumbent Firms 
Managers of incumbent firms are very concerned about the effects of liberalization on the 
performance of their firms. For example, in response to potential liberalization of the retail sector 
in India, Kishore Biyani (chief executive of the largest incumbent retailer in India), stated in 
opposition to the reform, “the retail sector…should not be given away to the foreign players 
while it is too young to compete on a level-playing field.” (Chari and Raghavan 2012). More 
recently, founders of incumbent Indian technology startups, who have been fiercely battling 
Western entrants including Amazon and Uber, have argued that foreign competitors destroy 
domestic industry and the Indian government should introduce protectionist measures (Punit 
2016). Our findings offer a means by which managers of incumbent firms can effectively 
compete with foreign competitors following liberalization, i.e., adjusting their marketing mix 
responses.  
Our findings suggest that incumbent firms with greater domestic market knowledge 
should intensify their distribution in response to liberalization. Their existing knowledge of 
domestic distribution networks and trade partners is a strong advantage for these firms, which 
they should exploit by intensifying their distribution to achieve strong performance following 
liberalization. While incumbent firms with greater domestic market knowledge intensify their 
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advertising, product mix, and promotions responses to liberalization, the findings of the 
performance model indicate that they do not benefit from these responses. Thus, these incumbent 
firms can reallocate their resources on these marketing elements to improve performance.  
Further, our findings suggest that incumbent firms with greater foreign market knowledge 
cut back on their promotions and distribution in response to liberalization. A potential reason for 
this may be that these incumbent firms are aware of the strength of foreign firms with respect to 
building intangible assets through advertising and product introduction, and thus may consider 
their spending on promotions and distribution to be superfluous in combating these entrants. 
However, our findings from the performance model suggest that while cutting back on their 
distribution is an appropriate response to liberalization for incumbent firms with greater foreign 
market knowledge, these firms can further improve their performance by intensifying their 
promotions. Finally, these incumbent firms do not respond through their advertising and product 
mix to liberalization, which is the appropriate strategy, as intensifying these marketing elements 
does not improve performance for these firms.   
We quantify the effects of incumbent firms changing their marketing mix responses 
(based on the estimation results) on their performance, and present them in Table E1 of 
Appendix E. These estimates suggest that following liberalization, incumbent firms can improve 
their profitability by as much as 30% by changing their marketing mix responses. 
1.6.2.2 Managers of Foreign Entrants  
Managers of foreign firms entering newly liberalized markets can use this research’s 
findings to benchmark themselves against incumbent competitors, and understand their potential 
marketing mix responses. For example, for foreign firms entering a market following 
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liberalization, incumbent firms with greater domestic market knowledge and foreign market 
knowledge with appropriate marketing mix responses are likely to emerge as strong competitors.   
1.6.2.3 Policymakers   
Policymakers may be tempted to heed the demands of business leaders to raise barriers to 
protect domestic firms from foreign competitors. For example, in response to the Indian 
government’s move to open up the aviation sector to foreign players, Ajay Singh [Chairman of 
one India’s largest aviation incumbents] stated, “…we believe the ultimate objective of policy 
should be to strengthen indigenous aviation….we believe work needs to be done by the 
government to ensure that we keep strengthening indigenous aviation…making sure the growth 
remains profitable growth in the country” (Jha 2016). Our study identifies marketing mix 
responses as a means to prevent the crowding out of domestic incumbent firms following 
liberalization. Policymakers need not accede to the demands of incumbent business leaders to 
heighten protectionist barriers, but can find ways to facilitate incumbent firms’ learning from 
foreign entrants including for example, through alliances and trade associations. 
1.6.2.4 Investors    
Our findings suggest that the marketing mix responses of incumbent firms play an 
important role in their performance during liberalization. Thus, institutional investors should 
consider the marketing mix responses of incumbent firms, while deciding targets of investment. 
Our findings show that when markets liberalize, incumbent firms with greater domestic market 
knowledge and foreign market knowledge who adjust their marketing mix responses achieve 




1.6.3 Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research   
Our study has some limitations that offer opportunities for further research. First, to gain 
an understanding of the complex phenomenon of liberalization, we focus on the effects of 
liberalization on incumbent firms. Future research on the responses and performance of 
incumbent firms during other forms of liberalization, including trade liberalization will be useful.    
Second, we study two factors (domestic market knowledge and foreign market 
knowledge) that affect incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses and performance following 
liberalization. Future research on other factors including Chief Executive Officer’s and 
marketing leadership’s foreign education or work experience, family ownership, the motivation 
of foreign entrants, employee salaries, mergers and acquisitions, and tangible and intangible 
government incentives will be useful. In addition, while we examine incumbent firms’ product 
mix, because of the lack of data availability, we are unable to study the effects of liberalization 
on incumbent firms’ product innovativeness and quality, which emerges as an area for future 
research. 
 Third, we examine the marketing mix responses of incumbent firms to liberalization in a 
single market, India. While this enables a clean test of the effects of liberalization on incumbent 
firms, future research could study liberalization in other markets to examine whether our findings 
generalize to other markets including, for example, the United States, Brazil, and China.  
To conclude, the findings of this first study on the role of incumbent firms’ marketing 
during liberalization provide novel insights on incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses to 
liberalization, and the resultant performance implications. Given the increasing pace of economic 
liberalization in markets around the world, we hope that our study stimulates additional work in 
this area.  
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Chapter 2: Forced to do Good: Firms’ CSR History, CSR Mandates, and 
Shareholder Value  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing consensus that the lack of environmental sustainability, increasing 
inequity, and continuous decline in societal trust pose a threat to ‘business as usual’ (Bénabou 
and Tirole 2010). This has increased societal demands for corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives on the part of firms. While firms’ CSR initiatives are, for the most part, voluntary and 
government intervention in CSR initiatives may seem antithetical, in an attempt to achieve 
inclusive development, some governments (e.g., China, India, and the United Kingdom) have 
enacted policies to encourage firms to engage in CSR initiatives and even, are going so far as to 
mandate firm CSR spending (Knudsen and Brown 2015). A priori, we know little about the 
effects of such government mandates related to CSR spending on firms’ responses and 
performance (Balch 2016), the issue we focus on in this research.  
 On the one hand, some firms may view a CSR mandate as a tax or the cost of doing 
business, believing that it increases costs and decreases performance. On the other hand, firms 
may welcome CSR mandates if they can strategically respond to these mandates, and use their 
CSR activities to increase goodwill and brand equity, and thus, improve their performance. A 
key factor that may determine the firm’s position on CSR mandates is their existing CSR policies 
(Seervai 2014). Hence, we propose that firms’ prior CSR experience will influence their 
responses to CSR mandates. 
From a theoretical perspective, marketing scholars have examined the effects of mandates 
on firms’ responses and performance (Moorman, Ferraro, and Huber 2012; Gielens et al. 2018). 
Studying firm responses to the Nutrition Labelling and Education Act (NLEA), Moorman et al. 
(2012) document considerable heterogeneity in firms’ responses based on market share, 
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category, and brand characteristics. Examining the effects of a sustainability mandate enforced 
by Walmart on its suppliers, recently, Gielens et al. (2018) find that most of the shareholder 
value gains from the mandate are appropriated by Walmart, with negative consequences for 
suppliers’ shareholder value.  
Developments in the marketing literature on CSR indicate that the effects of CSR 
activities on firm performance are contingent on complementary advertising and R&D spending 
(Luo and Bhattacharya 2009) and marketing capabilities (Mishra and Modi 2016). Our review of 
the literature indicates that, for the most part, extant studies in the CSR area, focus on firms’ 
voluntary CSR activities and have overlooked the effects of CSR mandates on firm performance.  
The only study to examine government-enforced CSR mandates, Manchiraju and Rajagopal 
(2017), finds that CSR mandates have a negative effect on firms’ shareholder value, except for 
those firms who have high advertising spending.  
However, our review of the literature indicates that three important aspects as they relate 
to CSR mandates have been overlooked, offering an opportunity for research that we address. 
First, differences in firms’ prior CSR spending may influence the effects of a CSR mandate on 
their performance. Second, the actual CSR spending of firms in response to the CSR mandate, 
which represents new information, based on which investors will update their expectations of 
future firm performance (Ioannou and Serafeim 2017), may also play a role in determining 
firms’ performance following the mandate. Thus, firms’ actual CSR spending responses 
following the mandate need to be accounted for (not examined in Manchiraju and Rajagopal 
(2017)). Third, also overlooked are the potential role of complementary characteristics in 
determining the effect of CSR mandates on firm performance (Mishra and Modi 2016).  
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Accordingly, in this research, we examine the effects of CSR mandates on firms’ CSR 
spending responses, and in turn, the effects of mandated CSR spending on firm performance. 
First, we study the differential effects of an increase in mandated CSR spending for firms already 
spending on CSR at the time of the CSR mandate (already-compliers) and firms who spend on 
CSR for the first time following the mandate (first-time compliers) on firm performance. Second, 
we examine how other firm characteristics, including agency concerns (i.e. business group 
affiliation and employee stock ownership) and marketing spending (on advertising, R&D, 
distribution, and promotion) moderate the relationship between mandated CSR spending and 
firm performance. 
The findings of this study are also managerially relevant. Despite governments’ 
reassurance about the benefits of CSR mandates, not all firms appear to be convinced about the 
value of responding to these mandates. As more firms start spending on CSR following a 
mandate, any competitive advantage from a given firm’s CSR spending may no longer be 
available to it. As a sustainability director of a firm with a long tradition of CSR activities stated 
with respect to such mandates, “Charitable giving used to be a big reputation builder for us, now 
it’s just about legal compliance.” (Balch 2016). Hence, these firms may view CSR mandates as 
just another way for governments to extract hard-earned profits from them in lieu of corporate 
taxation. Consistent with these arguments (Economic Times, 2013), some corporate leaders have 
voiced their fears about the benefits of mandated CSR spending. Thus, the research’s insights 
may be useful to senior managers and policymakers about the consequences, intended and 
unintended, of mandating CSR spending. 
Our main thesis is that the effect of mandated CSR spending on shareholder value will be 
different for already-compliers and first-time compliers. We use the two dominant theoretical 
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narratives in the CSR literature, agency theory and the resource based view (RBV), to draw our 
moderators – specifically, firms’ mechanisms to resolve agency concerns and their marketing 
spending, a key source of resources for firms. We combine developments in agency theory and 
RBV, to understand the differential effects of mandated CSR spending on the shareholder value 
of already-compliers and first-time compliers.  
We exploit a natural experiment in India to examine the effects of mandated CSR 
spending on firms’ shareholder value. In 2013, the Indian government passed a law mandating 
that all firms which crossed a given threshold of either net worth, sales, or net profit should 
spend 2% of the average of previous three year’s profits on CSR initiatives. This regulation 
offers a source of exogenous variation that enables identification of the effect of mandated CSR 
spending on firm performance. To further account for endogeneity, we use the control function 
estimation. Our sample for estimation includes 702 already-compliers (2,110 firm-years) and 782 
first-time compliers (2,125 firm-years) between 2013 and 2016. We measure shareholder value 
using a firm’s market capitalization, thus avoiding any potential confounds from accounting 
measures (Bendle and Butt 2018).  
 Our results indicate that on average, increased CSR spending following the mandate 
increases shareholder value for already-compliers. The empirical evidence supports 
heterogeneity in the effect of the CSR mandate on firms’ shareholder value. Following the 
mandate, an increase in CSR spending increases shareholder value for already-compliers with 
mechanisms to resolve agency concerns and increased advertising and R&D spending. For first-
time compliers, an increase in CSR spending following the mandate increases shareholder value 
when combined with increased advertising and R&D spending, and decreases shareholder value 
when combined with increased promotions spending. 
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The study’s findings make three novel contributions to the marketing literature. First, we 
contribute to the marketing literature related to policy which has, thus far, looked at the effects of 
nutrition labelling mandates (Moorman et al. 2012), sales taxes (Anderson et al. 2010), and 
retailer enforced sustainability mandates (Gielens et al. 2018) on firm behavior and performance, 
by studying a mandate related to firms’ social responsibilities. In doing so, we demonstrate that 
firms’ prior CSR behavior has important consequences for their performance following a CSR 
mandate.  
Second, we contribute to the CSR literature in marketing, by examining the effects of 
CSR spending on firm performance. In doing so, we extend the literature on the effect of 
corporate social performance (CSP) on firm performance (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; Luo and 
Bhattacharya 2009; Mishra and Modi 2016), the primary focus of extant empirical research. In 
accordance with extant research on CSP, our findings suggest that increasing CSR spending with 
advertising and R&D spending can improve shareholder value for all firms. In a novel extension 
to prior work, our findings indicate that firms’ prior CSR spending, mechanisms to resolve 
agency concerns, and other marketing spending can enhance or detract from the effects of their 
mandated CSR spending on shareholder value.   
Third, we contribute to the literature on the positive effects of mandates on firm 
performance (Porter and van Linde 1995). The extant literature on mandates related to CSR 
spending (Manchiraju and Rajagopal 2017) suggests that the effects of these mandates on firms’ 
performance are negative. We overturn this finding by demonstrating that once firms’ prior CSR 
spending and responses to the mandate are accounted for, CSR mandates can have a positive 
effect on firm performance. 
39 
 
2.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Across mandates, scholars (Moorman, Ferraro, and Huber 2012; Ahern and Dittmar 
2012) report considerable heterogeneity in firms’ responses and the corresponding effects of 
mandates on performance. Examining firms’ responses to the NLEA, Moorman, Ferraro, and 
Huber (2012) find that firms with low market share in a category improved their products’ 
nutrition levels in response to the mandate, while those with high market share reduced their 
products’ nutrition levels. Similarly, studying a regulation mandating corporate diversity in 
Norway, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find that the effect of mandated female board representation 
on firms’ shareholder value varies depending on whether they had voluntarily complied with the 
mandate in the past (i.e. already had 40% requisite female board representation). Thus, firms’ 
actions prior to the introduction of mandates appear to affect their responses and subsequent 
performance following the mandate. In the context of CSR mandates, some firms have already 
been spending on CSR activities when a mandate is introduced (already-compliers), while others 
will be spending on CSR activities for the first time (first-time compliers). We first discuss the 
effects of mandating CSR spending on the shareholder value of already-compliers and first-time 
compliers, following which we develop hypotheses of the interaction effects.  
2.2.1 Already-compliers 
Prior to the mandate, already-compliers may have been spending on CSR activities for two 
reasons. First, managers of already-compliers may have been spending on CSR activities which 
further their social, political, and career agendas, but do not necessarily improve their firms’ 
shareholder value (Kruger 2015). Second, firms may have been spending on CSR to generate 
reputational capital by increasing brand equity and signaling product differentiation, thus 
achieving competitive advantage (Hoeffler and Keller 2002). Consumers and investors may 
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attribute altruistic motivations (Berry, Burton, and Howlett 2018) to already-compliers’ CSR 
spending as they have been voluntarily spending on CSR before the mandate, and thus may be 
positively disposed toward these firms. Further, as already-compliers have prior experience in 
CSR activities, they may be well-poised to generate superior reputational capital through their 
CSR spending, and thus, may increase CSR spending beyond the mandated level to further 
differentiate themselves (Kitzmueller and Shimshack 2011), which should, ceteris paribus,  
increase shareholder value.  
At the same time, a CSR mandate will increase the number of firms spending on CSR 
activities, which, in turn, may increase consumers’ and investors’ scrutiny of firms’ CSR 
activities, motivating all firms to increase their CSR spending. With more firms spending on 
CSR, firms might find their brands “lost in the shuffle”, lowering the impact of their CSR 
activities. As more firms engage in CSR activities, the opportunities to create perceived 
differential advantage through increased CSR spending will lessen (Hoeffler and Keller 2002). 
Ultimately, CSR spending might become necessary to just create points of parity to match or 
negate the CSR spending of rival firms. This suggests that a CSR mandate may make it more 
difficult for already-compliers to achieve reputational capital and increase shareholder value 
through CSR spending than in the past. Thus, for already-compliers, there may be both positive 
and negative effects of an increase in mandated CSR spending on shareholder value.   
2.2.2 First-time Compliers  
Following the mandate, by definition, many firms will be forced to spend on CSR 
activities for the first time. These firms may spend on CSR activities which are symbolic but not 
substantive in nature (Marquis and Qian 2013), engaging in symbolic compliance with the 
governmental mandate without engaging in CSR activities that are truly effective. Further, first-
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time compliers may have little experience with CSR activities, and thus, may be less effective at 
generating reputational capital through their mandated CSR spending. Finally, consumers and 
investors may not be positively disposed toward first-time compliers if they believe these firms 
are mandatorily spending on CSR, as a result of which, their CSR activities may be perceived as 
forced and insincere (Groza, Pronschinske, and Walker 2011). At the same time, mandated CSR 
spending represents an opportunity for first-time compliers to build brand equity and signal 
product differentiation through their CSR activities (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006). Again, a 
priori, we anticipate both negative and positive effects of an increase in mandated CSR spending 
on shareholder value for first-time compliers. 
2.2.3 Agency Theory, Marketing Spending, and CSR Mandates   
As mandated CSR spending can have both positive and negative effects for already-
compliers and first-time compliers, we propose a contingency framework that explains when 
firms are most likely to reap the benefits or dampen the costs of CSR spending, as a consequence 
of the CSR mandate. Two key theories have been used to examine the relationship between CSR 
activities and firm performance - agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Friedman 1970; 
Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog 2016) and the resource-based view (RBV) (Barney 1991; Mishra 
and Modi 2016).  
Agency theory contends that, as agents of the firm’s shareholders (i.e. principals), managers 
enjoy informational advantages over their principals, which they can use for their personal gains 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). This, in turn, may lead to a conflict in goals between managers and 
shareholders which must be minimized through monitoring and contracts (Bergen, Dutta, and 
Walker 1992). Some scholars (e.g., Friedman 1970; Kruger 2015; Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog 
2016) have argued that CSR spending represents the diversion of scarce firm resources by 
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managers as agents toward unproductive activities. Often, it is difficult for shareholders to verify 
and evaluate the performance outcomes of a firm’s CSR activities. In the presence of agency 
concerns, managers may spend on CSR activities that elevate their personal status, but which 
may not necessarily improve shareholder value (Barnett 2007). Thus, agency theory predicts that 
to increase shareholder value through their CSR spending, firms should resolve agency concerns. 
Two mechanisms to resolve agency concerns in firms include monitoring and contracting. 
Accordingly, we examine two means of resolving agency concerns in firms, business group 
affiliation (monitoring) and employee stock options (contracting).  
The RBV of the firm contends that a firm’s CSR spending can build consumer-based brand 
equity through increased brand awareness, brand image, and brand engagement (Hoeffler and 
Keller 2002), creating a positioning advantage resulting in an intangible asset. Through improved 
brand equity, a firm’s CSR spending can also generate purchase intentions among its consumers, 
increasing sales (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). Further, CSR spending does not increase 
shareholder value in isolation, but only when combined with complementary marketing 
resources (Mishra and Modi 2016). A firm’s marketing spending which creates resources, can be 
either long-term or short-term oriented (van Waterschoot and van den Bulte 1992). We 
characterize those types of marketing spending as long-term which build resources for the firms 
through intangible assets including superior brand equity, technologies, and channel 
relationships, and those as short-term which generates sales for the firm immediately, but do not 
necessarily generate assets for the firm in the long-term. Extant marketing literature (Keller 
1993) suggests that a firm’s advertising spending builds intangible assets through brand equity 
(Rao, Agarwal, and Dahloff 2004), its R&D spending builds intangible assets through 
technology (Griliches 1991), and its distribution spending builds intangible assets through 
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channel relationships (Srinivasan 2006). However, a firm’s promotion spending can generate 
sales for the firm immediately, but may not contribute to the creation of intangible assets 
(Pauwels et al. 2004). We examine the interaction effects of four types of marketing spending 
with mandated CSR spending – three of which are long-term oriented (advertising, R&D, and 
distribution), and one which is short-term oriented (promotions), in nature.   
In sum, we combine developments in agency theory and the RBV of the firm, to understand 
the differential effects of mandated CSR spending on the shareholder value of already-compliers 
and first-time compliers. See Figure 2.1 for the conceptual framework. We next discuss the 
interaction effects of the relationship between firms’ mandated CSR spending and shareholder 
value. 
----Insert Figure 2.1 around here----  
2.2.4 Mandated CSR Spending and Agency Concerns   
Monitoring and contracting to resolve agency concerns will positively influence the relationship 
between a firm’s mandated CSR spending and shareholder value. However, we argue that this 
relationship will hold for already-compliers, but not for first-time compliers. First, already-
compliers initiated their CSR spending in a regime where CSR spending was not mandated. 
Thus, investors may perceive that already-compliers with agency concerns initiated CSR 
spending so managers could spend on philanthropic activities that bring them personal gains, by 
furthering their own social, political, or career agendas, and not to improve shareholder value 
(Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield 1985). In contrast, investors may not perceive agency concerns 
as decreasing shareholder value for first-time compliers as they initiated CSR spending in 
response to the mandate and not as a consequence of managers’ personal preferences.  
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Second, when already-compliers initiated CSR spending, the information environment 
surrounding firms’ CSR activities, including analysts’ and investors’ evaluation of firms’ CSR 
activities, may have been much less sophisticated, enabling wasteful spending in already-
compliers with agency concerns. The wasteful CSR routines that already-compliers developed 
previously may persist in the regime of mandated CSR, because of inertia (Nelson and Winter 
1982), decreasing shareholder value. In contrast, first-time compliers begin their CSR spending 
in a sophisticated information environment, in which there is increased scrutiny of their CSR 
activities following the mandate (Ioannou and Serafeim 2017), and thus are likely to develop 
more efficient CSR routines irrespective of the presence of agency concerns. We next discuss 
two means by which already-compliers can resolve agency concerns through monitoring 
(business group affiliation) and contracting (employee stock options).          
Business group affiliation. Business groups are sets of legally independent firms linked 
by formal and informal network ties (Khanna and Rivkin 2001). One mechanism to resolve 
agency concerns is through concentrated ownership, as present in business groups, where owners 
retain control of each firm affiliated with the business group, and may be better able to monitor 
self-serving managers (Morck and Yeung 2003), mitigating agency concerns (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). When agency concerns are mitigated through improved monitoring, managers 
may be more likely to spend on CSR activities that can generate reputational capital for the firm, 
as opposed to CSR activities that further their personal agendas, increasing shareholder value. 
Thus, we hypothesize, 
H1 (AC): For already-compliers affiliated with a business group, an increase in CSR spending 
following the mandate increases shareholder value.  
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Employee stock options. Theorists have long identified low levels of managerial stock 
ownership as symptomatic of agency concerns (Yermack 1995). Increasing the ownership levels 
of employees in the firm is an explicit contract to align the interests of employees with those of 
shareholders, ensuring that employees do not use their informational advantages to divert funds 
toward unproductive activities (Oyer and Schaefer 2005). When their interests are aligned with 
shareholders through stock options, managers may be more likely to direct the firm’s CSR 
spending toward activities that can generate reputational capital, increasing shareholder value. 
Thus, we hypothesize,  
H2 (AC): For already-compliers, as the proportion of employee stock options increases, an 
increase in CSR spending following the mandate increases shareholder value. 
2.2.5 Mandated CSR Spending and Long-term Oriented Marketing Spending   
We consider three types of long-term oriented marketing spending– advertising, R&D, 
and distribution, which build the market based assets of branding (Rao, Agarwal, and Dahloff 
2004), technology (Griliches 1991), and channels (Srinivasan 2006), respectively.  
A priori, we expect that long-term oriented marketing spending can help both already-
compliers and first-timers increase shareholder value through their mandated CSR spending. A 
firm’s CSR spending is also long-term oriented in nature, building superior reputation for the 
firm and relationships with key stakeholders including consumers over time. Thus, there are 
likely to be complementarities between a firms’ CSR spending and other long-term oriented 
marketing spending, which we further discuss below. Given the increased competition in the 
domain of CSR following the mandate, to solidify their competitive advantage through CSR 
spending, investors may perceive that already-compliers should increase long-term oriented 
marketing spending. Similarly, given first-time compliers’ lack of CSR experience, they are 
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likely to have the greatest chance of generating reputational capital when their CSR activities are 
combined with increased long-term oriented marketing spending.  
Advertising spending can help a firm create brand assets, increasing consumers’ and 
investors’ awareness of its CSR activities, generating positive attitudes. Further, advertising can 
not only inform the firm’s stakeholders about its socially responsible operations and core values, 
but also keep such information salient in their minds, which, in turn, can improve sales, profit, 
and the liquidity of the firm’s stock, increasing shareholder value (Luo and Bhattacharya 2009). 
Thus, we hypothesize, 
H3 (AC): For already-compliers, as advertising spending increases, an increase in CSR 
spending following the mandate increases shareholder value.  
H3 (FC): For first-time compliers, as advertising spending increases, an increase in CSR 
spending following the mandate increases shareholder value.  
 R&D spending can help firms generate technology assets, and in turn more product and 
process innovations, which can help them generate greater reputational capital through their CSR 
activities, by better satisfying emerging consumer needs (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006). Further, 
for firms who decrease or hold steady their R&D spending, increased CSR spending may cause 
attributions of misguided firm priorities amongst investors (Luo and Bhattacharya 2009), as CSR 
activities can generate negative attributions when accompanied by poor product quality resulting 
from cuts in R&D spending (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006). Thus, we hypothesize, 
H4 (AC): For already-compliers, as R&D spending increases, an increase in CSR spending 
following the mandate increases shareholder value.  
H4 (FC): For first-time compliers, as R&D spending increases, an increase in CSR spending 
following the mandate increases shareholder value.  
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 CSR spending can help a firm generate trust and identification with its channel partners 
(Homburg, Stierl, and Bornemann 2013), which it can leverage using increased distribution 
spending. Further, to take advantage of the positive brand associations and purchase intentions 
resulting from CSR activities, firms may need to ensure that their products are readily accessible 
to consumers, through increased distribution spending. Thus, we hypothesize,  
H5 (AC): For already-compliers, as distribution spending increases, an increase in CSR 
spending following the mandate increases shareholder value.    
H5 (FC): For first-time compliers, as distribution spending increases, an increase in CSR 
spending following the mandate increases shareholder value.    
2.2.6 Mandated CSR Spending and Short-term Oriented Marketing Spending  
We next consider promotion spending, which is short-term oriented in nature. While 
promotions can induce sales, removing consumers’ barriers to action and spurring immediate 
purchase, frequent promotions can induce perceptions of poor brand quality (Raghubir and 
Corfman 1999), decreasing brand equity and brand loyalty (Yoo et al. 2000). Some evidence 
suggests that, up to certain levels, promotions can amplify the sales effects of CSR spending 
(Andrews et al. 2014). We next discuss the effects of promotion spending on the relationship 
between mandated CSR spending and shareholder value for already-compliers, followed by for 
first-time compliers. 
Already-compliers. Consumers and investors may be more positively disposed toward 
already-compliers if they believe these firms voluntarily (Berry, Burton, and Howlett 2018) spent 
on CSR activities in the past. Further, already-compliers may have generated brand equity 
through their prior CSR activities, and have experience in generating reputational capital through 
their CSR spending, and thus maybe insulated from the negative effects of promotions on their 
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brand equity. Hence, already-compliers may be able to leverage their increased CSR spending 
through increased promotion spending, improving shareholder value. Thus, we hypothesize,  
H6 (AC): For already-compliers, as promotion spending increases, an increase in CSR 
spending following the mandate increases shareholder value. 
First-time compliers. In contrast to already-compliers, first-time compliers have not built 
reputational capital with consumers and investors through their past CSR activities. Further, first-
time compliers may not have the requisite experience to generate reputational capital through 
their CSR spending. As noted above, first-time compliers’ CSR spending may be perceived by 
consumers as forced and insincere (Groza et al. 2011). Thus, first-time compliers may not 
possess sufficient reputational capital to remain insulated from the negative perceptions 
generated by increased promotion spending. For these reasons, if first-time compliers increase 
promotion spending in conjunction with mandated CSR spending, investors may perceive that 
their brand equity and brand loyalty may suffer, decreasing future sales, and profits, and in turn 
shareholder value. Thus, we hypothesize,  
H6 (FC): For first-time compliers, as promotion spending increases, an increase in CSR 
spending following the mandate decreases shareholder value.  
In summary, we expect mechanisms to resolve agency concerns to positively moderate the 
relationship between mandated CSR spending and shareholder value for already-compliers (but 
not for first-time compliers), long-term oriented marketing spending to positively moderate the 
relationship between mandated CSR spending and shareholder value for both already-compliers 
and first-time compliers, and short-term oriented marketing spending to moderate the 
relationship between mandated CSR spending and shareholder value positively (negatively) for 
already-compliers (first-time compliers). We provide a summary of the hypotheses in Table 2.1.  
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----Insert Table 2.1 here---- 
2.3 DATA AND METHOD 
2.3.1 Empirical Context: CSR Spending Mandate in India in 2013  
We exploit a novel mandate directing firms to spend on CSR activities to study the 
effects of mandated CSR spending on their shareholder value. On August 29, 2013, the Indian 
government enacted the Companies Act of 2013. A distinctive feature of this legislation was 
Section 135, stating that, “every company having net worth of rupees five hundred crore or more, 
or turnover of rupees one thousand crore or more or a net profit of rupees five crore or more 
during any financial year shall ensure that the company spends, in every financial year, at least 
two per cent of the average net profits of the company made during the three immediately 
preceding financial years, in pursuance of its Corporate Social Responsibility policy.” We 
include further details of Section 135 of the Companies Act in Appendix F.  
Firms above the threshold(s) in the Act were required to either comply with the 
requirements of Section 135, or explain why they did not do so. While there was no penalty for a 
firm not spending on CSR activities, the firm’s officers were liable to specify reasons for non-
compliance in the firm’s annual report of the Board of Directors, as is common in mandates 
related to sustainability (Ioannou and Serrafeim 2017).  
When the Indian Companies Act of 2013 including the CSR mandate was introduced, 
some firms were already spending voluntarily on CSR activities. In Table 2.2, we provide details 
of the number of Indian firms (affected by the CSR mandate) who changed their CSR spending 
following the mandate. In 2014, of the 1,465 (affected) firms who were already spending on CSR 
activities, following the mandate, 785 firms and 543 firms increased and decreased CSR 
spending respectively, and 137 firms did not change their CSR spending. Of the 5,763 (affected) 
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firms who had never spent on CSR activities, following the mandate, 1,419 firms increased CSR 
spending, while 4,344 firms did not do so. Thus, there is considerable heterogeneity in firms’ 
CSR spending in response to the mandate.   
----Insert Table 2.2 here---- 
2.3.2 Data  
We use data on publicly-listed Indian firms from the Prowess Database of the Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), which has been used in past research to study firm 
performance in emerging markets (Banerjee, Prabhu, and Chandy 2015). CMIE is an 
independent think-tank that collects data on Indian firms, the main sources of data for CMIE 
include annual reports of firms, regulators, and stock exchanges. The firms in the Prowess 
database account for 75% of all corporate taxes and more than 95% of excise duties collected by 
the Indian government.  
We collect data on firms’ spending on CSR, advertising, R&D, distribution, and 
promotions. In addition, we collect data on firms’ market capitalization on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE), net worth, total assets, total sales, net profit, profit before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), business group affiliation, and proportion of employee 
stock option pay in firms’ total employee compensation. Our data spans the period from 2013 to 
2016. We provide the constructs, measures, and data sources in Table 2.3. 
---- Insert Table 2.3 here ---- 
2.3.3 Measures   
Shareholder Value. To ensure that our measure of shareholder value is comparable across 
industries and is un-confounded by the presence of accounting measures which differ based on 
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industry norms (Bendle and Butt 2018), we use a firm’s market capitalization to operationalize 
its shareholder value.   
 CSR. CSR spending in the Prowess database is reported under three heads—donations, 
social and community expenses, and environment related expenses, which we combine to 
compute a firm’s CSR spending (CSR). We provide the description of each type of CSR 
spending from the Prowess database in Appendix G. To exclude potential scale effects of firm 
size, we divide a firm’s CSR spending by its total assets. 
Resolving Agency Concerns. We operationalize a firm’s business group affiliation 
(BGROUP) using an indicator variable (1 if a firm is affiliated to a business group, 0 otherwise). 
The SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) defines employee stock options as “an 
option given to employees offering them the benefit of/right to purchase or subscribe to, at a 
future date, securities offered by the company at a predetermined price.” We operationalize 
employee stock options (ESOP) as the ratio of the firm’s employee stock options granted during 
the year to the total employee compensation.  
 Long-term Oriented Marketing Spending. The firm’s advertising (ADV) represents its 
spending on paid media, which we scale by the firm’s size measured by its total assets. 2 The 
firm’s R&D spending (R&D) represents its spending on research and development. Distribution 
(DIST) represents a firm’s spending to deliver products to various channel intermediaries 
including retailers, wholesalers, and distributors.     
Short-term Oriented Marketing Spending. The firm’s promotions (PRM) represents its 
spending on rebates, discounts, and sales promotions.  
                                                 
2 For missing values of each type of spending, we impute the value to .0001 before scaling by assets. 
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 Control Variables. We control for a firm’s size (SIZE) measured by the logarithm of total 
assets, a firm’s profitability (PRF) measured by the ratio of earnings before income taxes 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets, and a firm’s sales growth (SG), 
measured by the change in its sales over previous year’s sales. 
 We classify a firm as an already-complier firm if it spent on CSR activities in one or 
more years in the period from 2010 to 2012. The final sample of already-compliers with data on 
all variables consists of 2,110 firm-year observations (702 firms). We provide the descriptive 
statistics and a complete correlation matrix of the key variables for the sample of already-
complier firms, winsorized at 1%, in Table 2.4a. If a firm does not disclose CSR spending or has 
disclosed a CSR spending of 0 in the period between 2010 and 2012, we classify it as a first-time 
complier. The final sample of first-time compliers with complete data consists of 2,125 firm-year 
observations (782 firms). We provide the descriptive statistics and a complete correlation matrix 
of the key variables for the sample of first-timer compliers, winsorized at 1%, in Table 2.4b.   
----Insert Table 2.4a and 2.4b here---- 
2.3.4 Identification Strategy  
A key concern for hypotheses testing of the effects of firms’ mandated CSR spending on 
their shareholder value is endogeneity, i.e. that explanatory independent variables of interest may 
be correlated with the error term. To overcome this potential endogeneity concern, we use the 
control function approach (Petrin and Train 2010) where we obtain controls for the dependence 
between the endogenous independent variables and the error term. We do this in two steps. First, 
we perform an auxiliary estimation with the endogenous variable as the dependent variable and 
identify an instrumental variable that satisfies the exclusion restriction, i.e. it is correlated with 
the endogenous independent variable, but not correlated with the unobserved determinants of 
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shareholder value. The predicted residual from the auxiliary estimation provides a control 
function correction in the main estimation. By including these controls in the second-stage 
estimation, we ensure that the endogenous independent variables no longer correlate with the 
error term mitigating concerns of endogeneity. 
We estimate six auxiliary regressions for the six endogenous independent variables, CSR 
spending, employee stock options, advertising spending, R&D spending, distribution spending, 
and promotions spending, using the average of all other firms, excluding the focal firm, in the 
same three-digit NIC (National Industrial Classification) industry as instruments for each 
endogenous independent variable. There is empirical precedent for using industry average as an 
instrumental variable (Sridhar et al 2016). We do not estimate an auxiliary regression for 
business group affiliation as a firm’s business group affiliation is determined at its inception, and 
thus, is not endogenous. We subsequently demonstrate the robustness of the results to using the 
average of other firms in the same two-digit NIC industry as instruments for the endogenous 
independent variables. The auxiliary estimations for the first stage of the control function 
estimation are as follows:  
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼01𝑖 + 𝛼11𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑆𝑅−𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎1𝑡 + 𝜇1𝑖𝑡   (1) 
𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑃 =  𝛼02𝑖 + 𝛼12𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑃−𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎2𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑖𝑡 (2) 
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼03𝑖 + 𝛼13𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝐷𝑉−𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎3𝑡 + 𝜇3𝑖𝑡  (3) 
𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼04𝑖 + 𝛼14𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅&𝐷−𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎4𝑡 + 𝜇4𝑖𝑡 (4) 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼06𝑖 + 𝛼16𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇−𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎6𝑡 + 𝜇6𝑖𝑡 (5) 
𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼05𝑖 + 𝛼15𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑅𝑀−𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎5𝑡 + 𝜇5𝑖𝑡   (6) 
 
In equation (1), for firm i in period t, the fixed effect 𝛼01𝑖 represents firm specific 
heterogeneity in CSR spending, 𝛼11 represents the effect of industry average CSR spending 
(excluding the focal firm) on a firm’s CSR spending, 𝜎1𝑡  represents the year fixed effects, and 
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𝜇𝑖𝑡 is a random error term. The same logic applies to equations (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6), the 
auxiliary regressions for employee stock options, advertising spending, R&D spending, 
distribution spending, and promotions spending, respectively.  
We present the results for the auxiliary regressions for CSR spending, employee stock 
options, advertising spending, R&D spending, distribution spending, and promotion spending in 
Columns 1- 6 respectively of Table H1 in Appendix H. As expected, industry averages excluding 
the focal firm are a significant predictor of the focal firm’s CSR spending (p<.01), employee 
stock options (p<.01), advertising spending (p<.01), R&D spending (p<.01), distribution 
spending (p<.01), and promotions spending (p<.10). Thus, our instruments appear to be valid. 
Further, theoretically, our instrumental variables meet the exclusion restriction as it is unlikely 
that peer firms’ decisions on these variables would relate to the focal firm’s omitted variables 
that affect their shareholder value. 
 Following this, we estimate the second stage equation with the predicted residuals 
included from the first stage estimation for already-compliers and first-time compliers, 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8(𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽9(𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽10(𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽11(𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 × 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽12(𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 × 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽13(𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽14𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝜗𝑖?̂? +  𝜏𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡  
where β0i refers to the firm fixed effects, τt refers to the year fixed effects, β8-13 are the 
coefficients of interest, and β14 refers to the coefficients of the control variables, the coefficient 
vectors 𝛽15 captures the effect of the six predicted residuals in the vector 𝜗𝑖?̂? from the auxiliary 
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regressions (pertaining to CSR spending, employee stock options, advertising spending, R&D 
spending, distribution spending, and promotions spending) on shareholder value.  
2.4 RESULTS 
We first present the results of the estimation of the main effect of mandated CSR spending on 
shareholder value. Following that, we present the results of the estimation of mandated CSR 
spending on firm shareholder value, including the hypothesized interaction effects.  
 In Table 2.5 (Columns 1-2), we present the results of the estimation of the main effect of 
mandated CSR spending on shareholder value. In Column 1 of Table 2.5, we present the results 
for the sample of already-compliers, which suggest that an increase in mandated CSR spending 
significantly increases shareholder value (b = 2.729, p<.01). The overall model is significant 
with an F-statistic of 19.84 (p<.01). In Column 2 of Table 2.5, we present the results for the 
sample of first-time compliers, which indicate that an increase in mandated CSR spending 
marginally increases shareholder value (b = 1.211, p<.10). Again, the overall model is 
significant with an F-statistic of 10.42 (p<.01). Thus, increasing mandated CSR spending 
increases shareholder value significantly for already-compliers and marginally for first-time 
compliers.  
 Tests of Hypotheses. In Table 2.5 (Columns 3-4), we present the full model including all 
two-way interactions of a firm’s mandated CSR spending with the variables in our conceptual 
framework. In Column 3 of Table 2.5, we present the results for already-compliers. The results 
marginally support H1(AC), indicating that an increase in mandated CSR spending for already-
compliers affiliated with business groups increases shareholder value (b = 3.652, p<.10). The 
results strongly support H2(AC), suggesting that an increase in mandated CSR spending combined 
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with an increase in contracting through employee stock options for already-compliers increases 
shareholder value (b = 1.233, p<.01).  
We find support for H3(AC), as an increase in mandated CSR spending of already-
compliers combined with an increase in advertising spending increases shareholder value (b = 
1.835, p<.01 ). In addition, we find marginal support for H4(AC), indicating that an increase in 
mandated CSR spending combined with an increase in R&D spending increases shareholder 
value (b = 3.869, p<.10) for already-compliers. However, we do not find support for H5 (AC) and 
H6 (AC), as neither an increase in distribution spending (b = 1.815, not significant (n.s.)) nor 
promotion spending (b = 3.128, n.s.) combined with an increase in mandated CSR spending 
increases shareholder value. Thus, for already-compliers, an increase in mandated CSR spending 
combined with mechanisms to resolve agency concerns (business group affiliation and employee 
stock options) and increased long-term oriented marketing spending (advertising and R&D) 
increases shareholder value.  
In Column 4 of Table 2.5, we present the results for first-time compliers. We find support 
for H3(FC), as an increase in mandated CSR spending combined with an increase in advertising 
spending increases shareholder value (b = .822, p<.05) for first-time compliers. Similarly, an 
increase in mandated CSR spending combined with an increase in R&D spending increases 
shareholder value (b = 3.308, p<.05) for first-time compliers, supporting H4(FC). However, we do 
not find support for H5(FC), as an increase in mandated CSR spending of first-time compliers 
combined with an increase in distribution spending has no effect on shareholder value (b = 
2.772, n.s.). In relation to first-time compliers’ short-term oriented marketing spending, we find 
support for H6(FC), suggesting an increase in mandated CSR spending combined with an increase 
in promotion spending decreases shareholder value (b = -5.327, p<.05). Thus, for first-time 
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compliers, mandated CSR spending along with long-term oriented marketing spending 
(advertising and R&D) increases shareholder value, but decreases shareholder value along with 
short-term oriented marketing spending (promotions). We note that for completeness, we 
estimate and find no support for the moderating relationships related to the resolution of agency 
concerns (business group affiliation and employee stock options) for first-time compliers.  
----Insert Table 2.5 here---- 
2.4.1 Robustness Analysis 
We next discuss the robustness of the results to alternative model specifications, 
sampling variations, and alternative instrumental variables.  
Difference-in-difference analysis. To study the effects of the CSR mandate (exclusive of 
firms’ CSR spending responses) on firms’ shareholder value, we carry out a difference-in-
difference analysis, using firm-year observations in the period 2010 to 2016. We code the 
variable Post as 1 for firm-year observations belonging to the period 2013-2016, and 0 
otherwise. We code the variable Treat as 1 if a firm-year observation crosses the threshold for 
net worth, sales, or net profits mentioned in the Companies Act, 2013, and 0 otherwise. We use a 
generalized difference-in-differences (including firm fixed effects and year fixed effects), and 
control for a firm’s sales and net profit (scaled by assets), as these variables are used to assign 
firms’ into the treatment condition. Thus, we do not include the previous controls of firm size 
and profitability, as these are highly correlated with sales and net profits, but continue to control 




= 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 ×  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡
× 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡)  + 𝛽5(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡
× 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡)+𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜏𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
where Moderator refers to the six variables - business group affiliation, employee stock options, 
advertising spending, R&D spending, distribution spending, and promotions spending, β0i refers 
to the firm fixed effects, τt  refers to the year fixed effects. To overcome the threat of serially 
correlated outcomes and ensure that our standard errors are consistent, we cluster them at the 
firm-level (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).   
 We present the results of the difference-in-differences estimation in Table 2.6. In Column 
1 of Table 2.6, we present the results for already-compliers, which are consistent with the results 
of the control function estimation, indicating that mandated CSR spending increases shareholder 
value, in the presence of business group affiliation (b = .983, p<.05), increased employee stock 
options (b = .594, p<.10), increased advertising spending (b = .772, p<.01), and increased R&D 
spending (b = 2.285 , p<.01), thus supporting H1(AC), H2(AC), H3(AC) and H4(AC) respectively.    
 In Column 2 of Table 2.6, we present the results for first-time compliers, which are 
consistent with the results of the control function estimation, suggesting that mandated CSR 
spending increases shareholder value, in the presence of increased advertising spending (b = 
.283, p<.01) and R&D spending (b = .767 , p<.01), thus supporting H3 (FC) and H4 (FC). We note 
that the difference-in-difference results do not support H6 (FC) which the control function 
estimation does, a potential reason for this discrepancy may be because the control function 
estimation takes into account firms’ CSR spending while the difference-in-differences estimation 
is centered around whether a firm is mandated to spend on CSR or not.  
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----Insert Table 2.6 here---- 
Regression discontinuity. To examine the causal effect of mandated CSR spending on 
firms’ shareholder value, we employ the regression discontinuity (RD) method (Lee 2008). In 
our empirical context, the RD exploits the exogenous variation among firms who fall on either 
side of the threshold of net worth, sales, and net profit, above which they have to spend 2% of 
their profits on CSR activities. Whether firms fall just above or below the threshold is as good as 
randomly assigned, enabling the identification of the causal effect of mandated CSR spending as 
in a randomized experiment.  
In our context, as there are three running variables which assign firms to the treatment 
condition (net worth, sales, and net profits), we follow the procedure outlined in Wong, Steiner, 
and Cook (2013) to estimate multiple RD, using a single assignment variable and cutoff, after 
excluding all observations that are assigned to the treatment via the other assignment variables. 
We use sales as the assignment variable and a second-order polynomial to estimate the RD. 
Identification in an RD occurs because units are randomly allocated around the threshold (Lee 
and Lemieux 2010), thus, fixed effects estimation is not required to achieve identification. To 
account for dependence across firm-year observations and for heteroscedasticity, we cluster 
standard errors at the firm-level.  
 We present the results of the RD estimation in Table 2.7. In Column 1 of Table 2.7, we 
present the results for already-compliers, which support H2(AC), H3(AC) and H4(AC), suggesting that 
an increase in mandated CSR spending increases shareholder value for already-compliers with 
increased employee stock options (b = 2.814, p<.01), increased advertising spending (b = 1.404, 
p<.01) and increased R&D spending (b = 5.063, p<.01). In Column 2 of Table 2.7, we present 
the results for first-time compliers, which support H3(FC) and H4(FC), indicating that an increase in 
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mandated CSR spending increases shareholder value when combined with increased advertising 
spending (b = .663, p<.01) and increased R&D spending (b = 2.034, p<.01).           
----Insert Table 2.7 here---- 
We note that the RD results do not support H1(AC) and H6 (FC) which the control function 
estimation does, a potential reason for this discrepancy may be because the control function 
estimation takes into account firms’ CSR spending while the RD estimation, similar to the 
difference-in-differences estimation, is centered around whether a firm is mandated to spend on 
CSR or not.  
Sampling Variation. To check if our results are robust to sampling variations, we re-
estimate our main models after dropping 5% of the observations in the samples of already-
compliers and first-time compliers. We report these results in Column 1 and 2 of Table H2 in 
Appendix H, which support hypotheses H1-4 (AC), H3-4(FC) and H6(FC). 
Alternative Instrumental Variables. To demonstrate the robustness of our results to 
alternative instrumental variables, we re-estimate the two-stage control function by using the 
average values of all firms (excluding the focal firm) in the firm’s two-digit NIC instead of the 
firm’s three-digit NIC to instrument firms’ CSR spending, employee stock options, advertising 
spending, R&D spending, distribution spending, and promotion spending. We report these 
results in Column 1 and 2 of Table H3 in Appendix H which support hypotheses H1-4 (AC), H3-4(FC) 
and H6(FC). 
Further, we re-estimate the two stages of the control function estimation by including the 
controls used in the second-stage, firm size, firm profitability, and firm sales growth as controls 
in the first-stage of the estimation. We report these results in Column 1 and 2 of Table H4 of 
Appendix H, which support hypotheses H1-4 (AC), H3-4(FC) and H6 (FC). 
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2.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION  
Financial crises, rising consumer and employee safety concerns, and environmental 
disasters publicly linked to corporations have led to greater government regulation of CSR 
initiatives by firms. While some firms welcome government intervention in their CSR activities, 
other firms vehemently oppose it (Economic Times, 2013), suggesting considerable 
heterogeneity in the effects of CSR mandates on firm performance. Our study suggests that one 
factor influencing the effects of mandated CSR spending on firms’ shareholder value is their 
prior CSR spending behavior. Further, agency concerns and marketing spending also influence 
the effects of mandated CSR spending on firms’ shareholder value.  
Unlike the classical CSR studies that evaluate firms’ voluntary CSR activities (Luo and 
Bhattacharya 2006; 2009), we study the effect of mandated CSR spending on firms’ shareholder 
value. A priori, it is not clear whether findings on the impact of voluntary CSR activities will 
transfer to the context of mandated CSR activities (Gielens et al. 2018). We study the differences 
in voluntary and mandated CSR behavior by examining the differential effect of a CSR mandate 
on the shareholder value of already-compliers and first-time compliers. To do so, we exploit a 
mandate by the Indian government requiring firms that cross a given threshold of net profits, 
revenues, and net worth to spend 2% of their profits on CSR. We conclude by discussing the 
research’s theoretical contributions, implications for managers, policymakers, and investors, and 
limitations and opportunities for further research.   
2.5.1 Theoretical Contributions  
Through our study, we make three novel contributions to the literature. First, we 
contribute to the marketing literature related to mandates which has, thus far, looked at the 
effects of nutrition labelling mandates (Moorman et al. 2012), sales taxes (Anderson et al. 2010) 
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and retailers’ sustainability mandates (Gielens et al. 2018). Specifically, we extend this literature 
in two ways. First, we study the effects of a mandate related to firms’ social responsibilities, a 
key aspect of their marketing strategy (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). In doing so, we shed light 
on the role of marketing in ensuring firms can respond strategically to CSR mandates. Second, 
we demonstrate that firms’ past CSR behavior has important implications for their responses and 
performance following the mandate, thus establishing that firms’ prior behavior should be taken 
into account while studying the effects of mandates.  
Second, we contribute to the CSR literature in marketing, by examining the effects of 
CSR spending on firm performance. In doing so, we extend the literature on the effect of 
corporate social performance (CSP) on firm performance (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; Luo and 
Bhattacharya 2009; Mishra and Modi 2016), which has been the primary focus of empirical 
research in marketing. In addition, by studying the performance of already-compliers and first-
time compliers following the CSR mandate, we uncover differences in how investors react to 
voluntary versus mandated CSR spending. Further, we pioneer an investigation of the interaction 
between a firm’s CSR spending and spending on marketing actions such as promotions and 
distribution, answering calls for research on how different aspects of marketing contribute to 
firm performance in conjunction with CSR (Mishra and Modi 2016). Finally, by situating our 
study in India, we address the calls for research on the link between firms’ CSR spending and 
performance in developing countries (Mishra and Modi 2016).   
Third, we contribute to the economics literature on how regulation can be beneficial to 
firms (Porter and van der Linde 1995). Extant literature suggests that mandating CSR spending 
can have a negative effect on firm performance (Manchiraju and Rajagopal 2017). We overturn 
this finding in the literature, by demonstrating that after taking into account the previous CSR 
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spending behavior of firms, and firms’ spending responses, CSR mandates can have a positive 
effect on firm performance. Thus, counterintuitively, by forcing firms to do good, governments 
can also ensure that firms do well, increasing value for their shareholders.   
2.5.2 Managerial Implications   
This research’s findings on the consequences of mandated CSR spending for firm 
performance are novel and have useful implications for managers, policymakers, and investors, 
which we next discuss.  
2.5.2.1 Managers  
In a departure from prior research in the area of CSR, which has primarily examined firm 
CSP (which may not be entirely under managers’ control), we study the effects of firms’ CSR 
spending, which can be easily adjusted by managers. Our findings suggest that mandated CSR 
spending can increase shareholder value for firms under certain circumstances, and thus, 
managers should view CSR mandates as an opportunity to create value for their shareholders. 
We next discuss the different strategies, suggested by our findings, for firms to improve their 
shareholder value through mandated CSR spending. To do so, we perform additional analysis to 
quantify the effects of our findings for firms’ shareholder value. We present the results of this 
analysis in Table 2.8.  
In Panel A of Table 2.8, we quantify the percentage improvements in shareholder value 
that already-compliers can achieve by following our recommendations. For an already-complier 
affiliated with a business group, a two standard deviation (SD) in mandated CSR spending can 
increase shareholder value by 11.36%. Similarly, for already-compliers, a two SD increase in 
mandated CSR spending combined with a two SD increase in employee stock options, 
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advertising spending, and R&D spending, increases shareholder value by 15.34%, 15.98%, and 
9.63%, respectively.  
Similarly, in Panel B of Table 2.8, we quantify the percentage improvements in 
shareholder value that first-time compliers can achieve based on our recommendations. A two 
SD increase in mandated CSR spending combined with a two SD increase in advertising 
spending increases shareholder value by 9.65% for first-time compliers. Similarly, a two SD 
increase in mandated CSR spending combined with a two SD increase in R&D spending 
increases first-time compliers’ shareholder value by 11.09%, while a two SD increase in 
mandated CSR spending combined with a two SD decrease in promotion spending increases 
shareholder value by 10.27%. 
----Insert Table 2.8 here---- 
2.5.2.2 Policymakers   
For policymakers, our findings suggest that given appropriate responses and complementary 
spending, mandated CSR spending can have positive consequences for firms’ performance. 
Thus, by mandating CSR spending, governments can not only achieve inclusive development, 
but also aid firms in achieving strong performance.  
By mandating CSR spending, governments shine a light on firms’ CSR behavior, 
spurring comparisons by investors and other stakeholders, incentivizing firms to compete in the 
domain of CSR. Our findings suggest that firms who have prior experience executing CSR 
activities can excel in this environment, increasing their CSR spending to build positive brand 
equity with their consumers. However, firms who are spending for the first time, may be less 
likely to benefit from their mandated CSR spending, but can do so by adjusting other 
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complementary spending. Policymakers can work with firms to ensure that they adjust their 
mechanisms to resolve agency concerns and marketing spending appropriately, thus, benefitting 
from their mandated CSR spending. Our findings suggest that mandating CSR spending does not 
destroy the business rationale to spend on CSR, but instead amplifies it. 
2.5.2.3 Investors   
For investors, our findings indicate that when buying stocks of firms in markets with 
mandated CSR spending, they should examine a firm’s prior CSR spending (voluntary), its 
mechanisms to resolve agency concerns, and its marketing spending. In the case of firms who 
were already spending on CSR activities, investors should prioritize stocks of firms with 
mechanisms to resolve agency concerns, and those who increase spending on long-term oriented 
marketing, including advertising and R&D. In the case of firms who are spending for the first 
time on CSR activities, investors should prioritize stocks of firms who increase spending on 
long-term oriented marketing activities, including advertising and R&D, and those who decrease 
spending on short-term oriented marketing activities, including promotions.    
2.5.3 Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research   
As with all research, our study has some limitations which offer opportunities for further 
research. First, we look at CSR spending on aggregate. Our data does not allow us to examine 
the specific CSR initiatives that firms carry out. It is possible that different types of CSR 
initiatives carried out in response to a mandate may have different effects on the performance of 
already-compliers and first-time compliers. Future research can examine whether the 
relationships uncovered in this research hold at the disaggregate level. 
 Second, our study focuses on the effect of mandatory CSR spending on firm 
performance, we do not study the social impact of mandatory CSR spending. Future research can 
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examine whether mandatory CSR spending causes significant improvements in social outcomes, 
and which initiatives by firms, and which types of firms, are most likely to achieve the required 
social outcomes. 
 Third, we do not examine the effect of firms’ mandated CSR spending on consumer or 
investor behavior, we only infer it from the effects on shareholder value. It is likely that studying 
the effects of mandated CSR on individual consumer and investor behavior might reveal 
heterogeneity in how consumers and investors respond to firms’ mandated CSR spending. Future 
research can explore these micro foundations of mandated CSR spending. 
 To conclude, this research on the effects of CSR mandates on firm performance, suggests 
important consequences of mandated CSR spending for firms. Given the increasing inequality 
and environmental concerns across the world, we anticipate that an increasing number of firms 
are likely to be subject to the societal demands of CSR. We hope our study stimulates future 
work in this area.    
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Table 1.1: Constructs, Measures, and Data Sources 
Construct Measure Data source 
Dependent Variables   
Advertising Advertising spending/ Total assets CMIE Prowess Database 
Product mix Number of products  CMIE Prowess Database 
Promotions Promotion spending/ Total assets CMIE Prowess Database 
Distribution Distribution spending/ Total assets CMIE Prowess Database 
Independent Variables   
Post Indicator variable for Pre/Post liberalization 
event – 1 for observations after 1991, 0 
otherwise 
CMIE Prowess Database 
Liberalization Indicator variable – 1 if the three digit NIC 
industry is liberalized in the given year, 0 
otherwise 
Industrial Policy 
Resolution of India, 1991 
Domestic market 
knowledge 
Indicator variable – 1 if firm belongs to a 
business group, 0 otherwise 
CMIE Prowess Database 
Foreign market 
knowledge 
(Foreign exchange spending + Foreign 
exchange earnings) / Total assets 
CMIE Prowess Database 
Control Variables   
Firm size Total assets, lagged CMIE Prowess Database 
Firm profitability EBITDA/Total Assets, lagged CMIE Prowess Database 
Domestic competition Industry sum of domestic firms’ total sales / 
Industry sum of all firms’ total sales  




Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix  
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Advertising .01 .025           
2. Product mix 4.573 4.429 .019**          
3. Promotions .021 .038 .304*** .014**         
4. Distribution .026 .040 .184*** .012* .165***        
5. Post .894 .308 -.031*** -.084*** -.035*** -.029***       
6. Liberalization .467 .499 -.041*** .050*** -.018*** -.006 -.056***      
7. Domestic market knowledge  .498 .500 .070*** .228*** .018*** .046*** -.110*** 0     
8. Foreign market knowledge .146 .313 -.020*** .032*** .049*** .232*** -.009** .040*** .006    
9. Firm size 73.074 396.089 -.056*** .119*** .033*** .006 -.009* -.077*** .155*** -.027***   
10. Firm profitability .116 .129 .073*** .021*** .055*** .091*** -.04*** .056*** .042*** .132*** -.013**  
11. Domestic competition .855 .148 -.146*** -.053*** -.110*** -.016*** .136*** -.123*** -.013*** .012*** .060*** -.014*** 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
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Table 1.3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates and Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
Panel A – Difference-in-Differences Estimates without Controls  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Advertising Product mix Promotions Distribution 
Post * Liberalization (*10-2) -.045 27.2*** .178** .215*** 
 (.060) (6.470) (.077) (.083) 
Post (*10-2) -.223** 92.6*** -.373*** -.476*** 
 (.102) (12.1) (.135) (.145) 
Intercept .011*** 3.956*** .024*** .028*** 
 (.001) (.111) (.001) (.001) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 2.2 77.28 9.64 7.57 
Prob<F p<.01 p<.01 p<.01 p<.01 
Observations 19,468 40,526 29,087 25,051 
Number of Firms 4,267 7,541 5,648 4,838 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
Panel B – Difference-in-differences Estimates with Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Advertising Product mix Promotions Distribution 
Post * Liberalization (*10-2) .003 24.7*** .322*** .079 
 (.074) (8.580) (.097) (.101) 
Post .004 .493* -.004 .004 
 (.002) (.264) (.003) (.003) 
Firm size (*10-4) .001 16.4*** -.004** -.002 
 (.010) (1.41) (.002) (.002) 
Firm profitability .006*** .130 .012*** .015*** 
 (.001) (.113) (.002) (.002) 
Domestic competition -.001 .045 .001 -.001 
 (.001) (.148) (.002) (.002) 
Intercept .005** 4.308*** .021*** .019*** 
 (.002) (.262) (.003) (.003) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 2.72 53.80 12.54 10.27 
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 16,633 34,156 24,733 21,208 
Number of firms 3,927 7,073 5,243 4,512 




Panel C - Effects of Liberalization on Incumbent Firms’ Marketing Mix Responses – Difference-
in-differences with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Advertising Product mix Promotions Distribution 
Domestic market knowledge * Post *  
Liberalization .003** .323* .005** .004* 
 (.002) (.185) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post *  
Liberalization .003 -.081 -.008** -.009*** 
 (.003) (.303) (.003) (.004) 
Foreign market knowledge *  
Liberalization -.004 -.100 .003 .013*** 
 (.003) (.314) (.004) (.004) 
Domestic market knowledge * Post -.002* -.271* -.001 -.001 
 (.001) (.142) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post -.001 .032 .005** .002 
 (.002) (.212) (.002) (.002) 
Post *  Liberalization  -.003* .041 .001 -.000 
 (.002) (.163) (.002) (.002) 
Post .006** .681** -.004 .003 
 (.003) (.286) (.003) (.003) 
Foreign market knowledge .003* .558** .009*** .015*** 
 (.002) (.220) (.002) (.002) 
Firm size (*10-4) .001 16.4*** -.041** .001 
 (.010) (1.40) (.0192) (.002) 
Firm profitability .006*** .059 .010*** .010*** 
 (.001) (.113) (.002) (.002) 
Domestic competition -.001 .039 .001 -.001 
 (.001) (.148) (.002) (.002) 
Intercept .005** 4.214*** .020*** .016*** 
 (.002) (.264) (.003) (.003) 
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 2.68 41.75 20.43 36.85 
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 16,633 34,156 24,733 21,208 
Number of firms 3,927 7,073 5,243 4,512 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
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Table 1.4: Effect of Liberalization on Incumbent firms’ Marketing Mix Responses - Summary 
 
Effect of Liberalization on 
Marketing Mix Response 
Difference-in-differences  
Advertising No change 
Product mix Increase 
Promotions Increase 
Distribution No change 
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects  
Domestic Market Knowledge  
Advertising Increase 
Product mix Increase 
Promotions Increase 
Distribution Increase 
Foreign Market Knowledge  
Advertising No change 






Table 1.5: Additional Analyses 
Panel A – Difference-in-differences with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Control for 
Reduction in Trade Tariffs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Advertising Product mix Promotions Distribution 
Domestic market knowledge * Post * 
Liberalization .003** .313* .005** .003 
 (.002) (.185) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post * 
Liberalization .003 -.055 -.007** -.008** 
 (.003) (.304) (.003) (.004) 
Foreign market knowledge * 
Liberalization -.005* -.121 .003 .013*** 
 (.003) (.314) (.004) (.004) 
Domestic market knowledge * Post -.002* -.257* -.001 -.000 
 (.001) (.142) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post -.001 .012 .005** .002 
 (.002) (.213) (.002) (.002) 
Post * Liberalization  -.004** -.058 .000 -.003 
 (.002) (.182) (.002) (.002) 
Post * Trade Liberalization .002* .161 .002 .004** 
 (.001) (.133) (.001) (.002) 
Post .005* .625** -.004 .002 
 (.003) (.289) (.003) (.003) 
Foreign market knowledge .004* .573*** .009*** .016*** 
 (.002) (.220) (.002) (.002) 
Firm size (*10-5) .006 164.000*** -.416** -.015 
 (.010) (14.000) (.192) (.188) 
Firm profitability  .006*** .061 .010*** .011*** 
 (.001) (.113) (.002) (.002) 
Domestic competition -.001 .027 .001 -.001 
 (.001) (.148) (.002) (.002) 
Intercept  .005** 4.227*** .020*** .017*** 
 (.002) (.264) (.003) (.003) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 2.72 39.92 19.57 37.18 
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 16,633 34,156 24,732 21,208 
Number of firms 3,927 7,073 5,242 4,512 







Panel B – Difference-in-differences with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Controls for 
Number of Foreign Firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Advertising Product mix Promotions Distribution 
Domestic market knowledge * Post 
* Liberalization .003* .336* .005** .004* 
 (.002) (.185) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post * 
Liberalization .003 -.080 -.008** -.009*** 
 .003) (.303) (.003) (.004) 
Foreign market knowledge * 
Liberalization -.004 -.076 .003 .013*** 
 (.003) (.314) (.004) (.004) 
Domestic market knowledge * Post -.002* -.282** -.001 -.001 
 (.001) (.142) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post -.001 .032 .005** .002 
 (.002) (.212) (.002) (.002) 
Post * Liberalization  -.003* -.005 .001 -.000 
 (.002) (.163) (.002) (.002) 
Post .005* .925*** -.003 .004 
 (.003) (.289) (.003) (.003) 
Foreign market knowledge .004* .544** .009*** .015*** 
 (.002) (.220) (.002) (.002) 
Firm size (*10-5) .011 165.000*** -.419** -.004 
 (.095) (14.000) (.192) (.188) 
Firm profitability  .006*** .072 .010*** .011*** 
 (.001) (.113) (.002) (.002) 
Domestic competition -.000 -.070 .001 -.001 
 (.001) (.149) (.002) (.002) 
Number of foreign firms (*10-3)  . 133** -37.000*** -.149 -.116 
 (.066) (6.000) (.091) (.096) 
Intercept .004* 4.375*** .021*** .017*** 
 (.002) (0.265) (.003) (.003) 
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 2.75 41.39 19.62 39.96 
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 16,633 34,156 24,733 21,208 
Number of firms 3,927 7,073 5,243 4,512 
        *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
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Table 1.6: Effect of Incumbent Firms’ Marketing Mix Responses on Firm Performance during 
Liberalization 
 Firm performance 
Domestic market knowledge * Foreign competition * Advertising  -.714 (.858) 
Domestic market knowledge * Foreign competition * Product mix -.008 (.009) 
Domestic market knowledge * Foreign competition * Promotions -.617 (.611) 
Domestic market knowledge * Foreign competition * Distribution 1.602* (.867) 
Foreign market knowledge * Foreign competition * Advertising 1.930 (1.289) 
Foreign market knowledge * Foreign competition * Product mix -.010 (.009) 
Foreign market knowledge * Foreign competition * Promotions 1.692** (.859) 
Foreign market knowledge * Foreign competition * Distribution -2.237*** (.732) 
Domestic market knowledge * Foreign competition   .009 (.096) 
Foreign market knowledge * Foreign competition  .099 (.084) 
Domestic market knowledge * Advertising .348 (.271) 
Domestic market knowledge * Product mix .002 (.002) 
Domestic market knowledge * Promotions -.149 (.145) 
Domestic market knowledge * Distribution -.326** (.147) 
Foreign market knowledge * Advertising -.511 (.434) 
Foreign market knowledge * Product mix .002 (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Promotions -.091 (.146) 
Foreign market knowledge * Distribution .047 (.096) 
Foreign competition * Advertising .190 (.695) 
Foreign competition * Product mix .004 (.008) 
Foreign competition * Promotions -.192 (.401) 
Foreign competition * Distribution -.114 (.797) 
Foreign competition -.059 (.073) 
Foreign market knowledge .057*** (.012) 
Advertising .002 (.229) 
Product mix (*10-2) -.039 (.134) 
Promotions .174 (.114) 
Distribution .264** (.123) 
Firm size (*10-5) .374 (1.18) 
Firm profitability .211*** (.012) 
Domestic competition .025 (.018) 
Intercept .073*** (.026) 
Industry fixed effects * Post Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
F-statistic  11.07 
Prob>F .000 
Observations 9,927 
Number of firms 2,433 

















on Firm Performance 
Domestic Market Knowledge 
Advertising Increase No effect 
Product mix Increase No effect 
Promotions Increase No effect 
Distribution Increase Increase 
Foreign Market Knowledge   
Advertising No change No effect 
Product mix No change No effect 
Promotions Decrease Increase 
Distribution Decrease Decrease 
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Resolution of Agency Concerns   
Mandated CSR Spending and Business Group 
Affiliation (H1(AC)) 
Positive - 
Mandated CSR Spending and Employee Stock Options 
(H2(AC)) 
Positive - 
Long-term Oriented Marketing Spending   
Mandated CSR Spending and Advertising (H3(AC)/ 
H3(FC)) 
Positive Positive 
Mandated CSR Spending and R&D (H4(AC)/ H4(FC)) Positive Positive 
Mandated CSR Spending and Distribution (H5(AC)/ 
H5(FC)) 
Positive Positive 
Short-term Oriented Marketing Spending   






Table 2.2: Firms’ Responses to the Mandate 
Treated Already-compliers 2014 2015 
Increased CSR 785 738 
Decreased CSR 543 238 
Same CSR 137 53 
Treated First-time Compliers 2014 2015 
Increased CSR  1,419 1,239 
Same CSR 4,344 2,520 
The table presents the number of already-complier firms who increased, decreased and kept their CSR spending constant in the 
two years following the CSR mandate, and the number of first-time complier firms increasing their CSR spending and keeping it 
constant in the two years following the CSR mandate.  
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Table 2.3: Key Constructs, Measures, and Data Sources 
Construct Measure Data Sources 
Shareholder value Market capitalization on the Bombay 
stock exchange (BSE) 




CSR / Total assets CMIE Prowess Database 
Mechanisms to resolve agency concerns 
Business group 
affiliation 
Indicator variable – 1 if firm belongs to a 
business group, 0 otherwise 
CMIE Prowess Database 
Employee stock 
options 
Employee stock options granted/ Total 
employee compensation 
CMIE Prowess Database 
Long-term oriented marketing spending 




R&D/ Total assets CMIE Prowess Database 
Distribution Distribution/ Total assets CMIE Prowess Database 
Short-term oriented marketing spending 
Promotions Promotions/ Total assets CMIE Prowess Database 
Control variables   
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets CMIE Prowess Database 
Firm profitability EBITDA/ Total assets CMIE Prowess Database 










Table 2.4: Descriptives and Correlation Matrix 
Table 2.4a – Descriptives and Correlation Matrix – Already-compliers 
 Mean  SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Shareholder value (INR Mil.) 64303.43 175116.6           
2. CSR  .001 .001 .04*          
3. Advertising .005 .014 .10*** .10***         
4. R&D .002 .004 .18*** .17*** .08***        
5. Promotions .013 .023 .01 .16*** .28*** .28***       
6. Distribution .017 .024 -.03 .06*** .28*** .11*** .25***      
7. Business group affiliation .601 .490 .19*** 
-
.11*** -.01 .06*** 
-
.08*** .03     
8. Employee stock options  .001 .002 .27*** -.02 .14*** .10*** .03 
-
.07*** .06***    
9. Firm size (Log INR Mil.) 9.366 1.79 .55*** 
-
.19*** .01 .01 
-
.12*** -.05** .43*** .22***   





11. Firm sales growth  .148 .852 .00 -.01 -.01 -.01 .00 -.04* -.04* .00 -.04* .01 
 
Table 2.4b – Descriptives and Correlation Matrix – First-time compliers 
 Mean  SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Shareholder value (INR Mil.) 33405.81 135496           
2. CSR  .0002 .0007 .08***          
3. Advertising .005 .014 .10*** .16***         
4. R&D .001 .004 .10*** .15*** .14***        
5. Promotions .009 .023 .02 .16*** .36*** .22***       
6. Distribution .01 .021 .07*** .18*** .38*** .23*** .40***      
7. Business group affiliation .414 .492 .20*** .06*** .04*** .11*** .08*** .17***     
8. Employee stock options  .0003 .002 .15*** .03* .12*** .04** .06*** .06*** .07***    
9. Firm size (Log INR Mil.) 7.583 2.849 .39*** .11*** .06*** .18*** .15*** .22*** .46*** .16***   
10. Firm profitability .095 .112 .14*** .26*** .17*** .22*** .25*** .32*** .12*** .08*** .32***  
11. Firm sales growth  .201 1.077 -.01 -.05** -.02 -.04** -.03 -.04** -.02 -.02 -.04** -.01 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
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Table 2.5: Mandated CSR Spending and Shareholder Value – Full Model 














   (2.076) (1.635) 




   (.475) (.414) 
CSR * Advertising (*108)   1.835*** .822** 
   (.551) (.397) 
CSR * R&D (*108)   3.869* 3.308** 
   (1.976) (1.568) 
CSR * Distribution (*107)   1.815 2.772 
   (4.217) (3.221) 
CSR * Promotions (*107)   3.128 -5.327** 
   (2.688) (2.341) 
Control Variables     
CSR (*106) 27.29*** 12.11* .105 -.404 
 (8.91) (6.48) (10.040) (6.941) 
Employee stock options (*107)   3.944*** .737 
   (1.336) (.801) 
Advertising (*106)   -5.391 3.798 
   (5.741) (4.177) 
R&D (*107)   1.277* 1.411*** 
   (.712) (.422) 
Distribution (*106)   2.594 3.573** 
   (2.249) (1.651) 
Promotions (*107)   1.303* .587 
   (.740) (.377) 
Firm size (*105) .145** .111** .120** .124*** 
 (.060) (.044) (.061) (.044) 
Firm profitability (*105) .511** .614*** .305 .560*** 
 (.225) (.146) (.227) (.146) 
Firm sales growth (*104) .511*** .034 .621*** .284 
 (.174) (.075) (.172) (.749) 
Residuals from first stage     
CSR (*106) -25.15*** -10.10 -4.051 -.663 
  (8.97) (.659) (9.913) (6.887) 
Employee stock options (*107)   -3.942*** -.795 
   (1.337) (.800) 
Advertising (*106)   5.313 -3.502 
   (5.746) (4.189) 
R&D (*107)   -1.437** -1.469*** 
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Table 2.5 continued 
   (.704) (.421) 
Distribution (*106)   -2.417 -3.390** 
   (2.245) (1.646) 
Promotions (*107)   -1.317* -.594 
   (.739) (.376) 
Intercept (*106) -.107* -.079** -.252*** -.234*** 
 (.057) (.040) (.090) (.056) 
     
Observations 2,111 2,126 2,110 2,125 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 19.84 10.42 9.96 8.57 
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 
































Table 2.6: Mandated CSR Spending and Shareholder Value - Differences-in-Differences 
Estimates 
  Already-compliers First-time compliers 
      
Post * Treat * Business group affiliation 
(*104) .983** .432** 
 (.445) (.170) 
Post * Treat * Employee stock options 
(*106) .594* -.030 
 (.354) (.237) 
Post * Treat * Advertising (*106) .772*** .283*** 
 (.232) (.095) 
Post * Treat * R&D (*106) 2.285*** .767*** 
 (.568) (.247) 
Post * Treat * Distribution (*105) -.588 .617 
 (.741) (.487) 
Post * Treat * Promotions (*105) .617 .190 
 (1.379) (.438) 
Post * Business group affiliation (*104) -.230** .253 
 (.101) (.206) 
Post * Employee stock options (*106) -.119 .027 
 (.166) (.066) 
Post * Advertising (*105) -.029 .197** 
 (.831) (.094) 
Post * R&D (*105) .026 1.091 
 (.762) (.849) 
Post * Distribution (*105) -.219 -.102*** 
 (.225) (.036) 
Post * Promotions (*105) -.299 -.074** 
 (.232) (.037) 
Treat * Business group affiliation (*104) -.174 -.307*** 
 (.296) (.106) 
Treat * Employee stock options (*106) -.236 .090 
 (.319) (.247) 
Treat * Advertising (*105) -.990 -.839 
 (1.910) (.586) 
Treat * R&D (*106) -1.425*** -.485** 
 (.444) (.195) 
Treat * Distribution (*106) -.108* -.018 
 (.058) (.033) 
Treat * Promotions (*105) -.698 -.226 
 (.803) (.347) 
Employee stock options (*106) .210*** .066 
 (.055) (.082) 
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Table 2.6 continued 
Advertising (*105) .281 .331* 
 (1.049) (.199) 
R&D (*106) .218 -.018 
 (.234) (.076) 
Distribution (*106) -.121 .023* 
 (.181) (.013) 
Promotions (*105) -.199 .060 
 (.509) (.069) 
Post (*104) .778*** .260*** 
 (.158) (.582) 
Treat (*103) -.680 .391 
 (.227) (.766) 
Post * Treat (*104) -.242 -.448 
 (.342) (.126) 
Profit after tax/ Assets (*105) .506*** .042*** 
 (.169) (.010) 
Sales growth (*104) .144 -.001 
 (.148) (.003) 
Sales (Logged) (*104) .129 .061*** 
 (.330) (.016) 
Intercept (*105) .198 .027** 
 (.243) (.011) 
   
Observations 4,951 9,693 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
R-squared .114 .126 



















Table 2.7: Mandated CSR Spending and Shareholder Value – Regression Discontinuity 
Estimates 




      
Treat * Business group affiliation (*105) -.108 -.053 
 (.173) (.085) 
Treat * Employee stock options (*106) 2.814*** 1.900** 
 (.889) (.968) 
Treat * Advertising (*106) 1.404*** .663*** 
 (.410) (.213) 
Treat * R&D (*106) 5.063*** 2.034*** 
 (1.391) (.665) 
Treat * Distribution (*106) -.853*** .028 
 (.318) (.143) 
Treat * Promotions (*106) -.138 .095 
 (.402) (.164) 
Treat (*105) -.270 -.103 
 (.183) (.203) 
   
Observations 1,978 4,925 
R-squared .623 .728 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered 
at the firm level   
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 






Table 2.8: Economic Significance of Effects 











Mandated CSR and 
Business Group Affiliation  .004 .002 1 7304 64304 11.36% 
Mandated CSR and ESOP 12.33 .002 .004 9864 64304 15.34% 
Mandated CSR and 
Advertising 1.835 .002 .028 10276 64304 15.98% 
Mandated CSR and R&D 3.869 .002 .008 6190.4 64304 9.63% 
 











Mandated CSR and 
Advertising 8.22  .0014 .028 3222.24 33405.81 9.65% 
Mandated CSR and R&D 33.08  .0014 .008 3704.96 33405.81 11.09% 
Mandated CSR and 





















































Notes: For ease of presentation, the main effects of the various moderators on incumbent firms’ marketing mix responses, which are 
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APPENDIX A: ORGANIZING FRAMEWORK FOR EXTANT RESEARCH 
Figure A1 – Organizing Framework for Research on Competition 
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Key factors of incumbents 
considered Industry 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) Plant productivity None None Manufacturing 
Haskel, Perreira, and 
Slaughter (2007) Plant productivity None None Manufacturing 
Blalock and Simon (2009) Productivity None 
Absorptive capacity/ 
production capacity Manufacturing 
Ayyagari and Kosova 
(2010) Domestic entry None Industry type All 
Kosova (2010) 
Domestic firm growth 
and survival None None All 
Zhang et al. (2010) Productivity None Size, technology gap Manufacturing 
Zhang et al. (2014) Productivity None None Manufacturing 
Ayyagari et al (2015) Capital investment None Business group affiliation All 
     




Domestic market knowledge 





APPENDIX B: COMPARISON OF LIBERALIZED AND UN-LIBERALIZED INDUSTRIES 







Note: The figures above include the kernel density plots of key firm characteristics (i.e., firm size, sales, 









Table B1 - Comparison of Liberalized and Un-liberalized Industries 
 Liberalized Un-liberalized p-value 
Advertising .014 .017 .514 
Product mix 6.347 7.034 .532 
Promotions .019 .024 .279 
Distribution .023 .028 .290 
Domestic market knowledge .723 .775 .335 
Foreign market knowledge .168 .116 .295 
Firm size (USD Million) 44.36 45.25 .942 
Firm profitability .134 .120 .346 
Domestic competition .775 .820 .476 
Note: This table contains comparisons of average values across three digit NICs that were un-liberalized vs those that were in 




APPENDIX C:  DESCRIPTIONS OF MARKETING MIX VARIABLES IN PROWESS DATA 
DICTIONARY 
Advertising, promotions, and distribution are disparate activities and thus very different 
expenditure items, thus, they are reported separately. 
Advertising – Advertising involves the conveying of information through paid media, is not 
directed to any person in specific and hence is non-direct in nature. 
Promotions – Captures data on rebates and discounts as well as sales promotions. 
Rebates and discounts – Rebates and discounts are marketing tools involving reduction in 
the invoice amount to be paid by a customer. They are aimed at encouraging purchases 
by prospective customers and enhancing the likelihood of the offtake of goods produced/ 
services. These are essentially price-related marketing expenses incurred by a firm. A 
rebate is a refund granted to a buyer by a manufacturer, distributor or dealer for making 
purchases above a certain amount or a certain volume during a particular time frame or 
during the course of a contract or an agreement. Manufacturers generally give rebates to 
bring down the effective final price of their products. A discount, on the other hand, is an 
amount or percentage of reduction in selling price of a product, given on a single 
transaction, and not at the end of a time frame/contract. It is unconditional in nature and 
offered to all customers, subject to their meeting certain conditions in terms of purchase 
volumes, etc. It is usually fixed in nature, i.e. it is granted as a percentage of the billing 
amount. 
 
Sales promotions - It is a short term and direct method of garnering sales. The American 
Marketing Association defines sales promotions as ‘those marketing activities other than 
personal selling advertising and publicity that stimulate consumer purchasing and dealer 
effectiveness, such as display shows and exhibitions, demonstrations, and various non-
recurrent selling efforts not in the ordinary routine.’ Sales promotions help in informing, 
persuading and reminding prospective and existing customers about a company and its 
products. 
 
Distribution - This is the expenditure the company incurs to deliver its products to consumers or 
intermediaries such as distributors, wholesalers or retailers. It includes freight outward and 
handling charges. Loading and unloading of goods, freight expenses incurred by the company for 
transporting the goods from its premises to dealers or distributors are included under this item 
head. Sometimes, companies refer to such expenses as dispatch and forwarding expenditure. 
Amounts reported as breakage and shortage, loss of goods in transit, consignment expenses, etc. 
are included, by CMIE, under distribution expenses. 
 
Products - For each product of the firm, the Prowess database provides the value of sales, 




APPENDIX D:  ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
Table D1 – Difference-in-differences with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Controls for 
Foreign Firms’ Marketing 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Advertising Products Promotions Distribution 
Domestic market knowledge * 
Post * Liberalization .003* .322* .005** .004 
 (.002) (.185) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post 
* Liberalization .003 -.065 -.008** -.009** 
 (.003) (.304) (.003) (.004) 
Foreign market knowledge * 
Liberalization -.004 -.120 .003 .013*** 
 (.003) (.314) (.004) (.004) 
Domestic market knowledge * 
Post -.002* -.272* -.002 -.001 
 (.001) (.142) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post -.001 .019 .005** .002 
 (.002) (.213) (.002) (.002) 
Post * Liberalization  -.003* .033 .001 -.000 
 (.002) (.163) (.002) (.002) 
Post .006** .669** -.004 .003 
 (.003) (.288) (.003) (.003) 
Foreign market knowledge .004* .573*** .009*** .015*** 
 (.002) (.220) (.002) (.002) 
Firm size (*10-5) .018 164.000*** -.410** .023 
 (.095) (14.100) (.192) (.188) 
Firm profitability  .006*** .060 .010*** .010*** 
 (.001) (.113) (.002) (.002) 
Domestic competition -.001 .013 .000 -.001 
 (.001) (.150) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign firms' marketing  -.004 -.517 -.014*** -.019*** 
 (.002) (.423) (.004) (.005) 
Intercept .005** 4.283*** .021*** .018*** 
 (.002) (.271) (.003) (.003) 
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 2.68 39.9 19.91 37.65 
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 16,623 34,149 24,719 21,196 
Number of firms 3,925 7,072 5,239 4,509 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
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Table D2 – Difference-in-differences with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Controls for 
Industry Concentration and R&D intensity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Advertising Products Promotions Distribution 
Domestic market 
knowledge * Post * 
Liberalization .003* .323* .005** .004 
 (.002) (.185) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge 
* Post * Liberalization .003 -.081 -.008** -.009*** 
 (.003) (.303) (.003) (.004) 
Foreign market knowledge 
* Liberalization -.004 -.101 .003 .013*** 
 (.003) (.314) (.004) (.004) 
Domestic market 
knowledge * Post -.002* -.269* -.001 -.001 
 (.001) (.142) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge 
* Post -.001 .034 .005** .002 
 (.002) (.212) (.002) (.002) 
Post * Liberalization  -.003* .040 .001 -.000 
 (.002) (.163) (.002) (.002) 
Post .006** .692** -.004 .003 
 (.003) (.286) (.003) (.003) 
Foreign market knowledge .003* .555** .010*** .015*** 
 (.003) (.220) (.002) (.002) 
Industry concentration .001 .153 -.006* .009** 
 (.002) (.246) (.004) (.004) 
R&D intensity .036 -.696 .031 .035 
 (.024) (2.998) (.034) (.035) 
Firm size (*10-5) .001 164.000*** -.396** -.003 
 (.010) (14.100) (.192) (.019) 
Firm profitability  .006*** .061 .010*** .011*** 
 (.001) (.113) (.002) (.002) 
Domestic competition -.001 .045 .001 -.001 
 (.001) (.148) (.002) (.002) 
Intercept .005** 4.180*** .021*** .015*** 
 (.002) (.269) (.003) (.003) 
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 2.56 38.14 18.82 35.58 
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 16,633 34,156 24,732 21,208 
Number of firms 3,927 7,073 5,242 4,512 





Table D3 – Difference-in-differences with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Including 
Industry Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Advertising Products Promotions Distribution 
          
Domestic market knowledge * 
Post * Liberalization .004** .359* .006*** -.000 
 (.002) (.196) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post 
* Liberalization .006** -.286 -.007* -.004 
 (.003) (.344) (.004) (.004) 
Foreign market knowledge * 
Liberalization -.007** .094 .002 .008** 
 (.003) (.350) (.004) (.004) 
Domestic market knowledge * 
Post -.003* -.303** -.003 .002 
 (.002) (.149) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post -.002 .029 .004 -.003 
 (.002) (.233) (.002) (.003) 
Post * Liberalization  -.006 .394 .006 -.020* 
 (.006) (.767) (.010) (.011) 
Post .004 1.827*** .005 .001 
 (.003) (.366) (.004) (.004) 
Foreign market knowledge .004** .546** .011*** .020*** 
 (.002) (.239) (.003) (.003) 
Firm size (*10-5) .013 166.000*** -.334* -.036 
 (.096) (14.000) (.194) (.189) 
Firm profitability  .006*** .056 .010*** .011*** 
 (.001) (.113) (.002) (.002) 
Domestic competition -.001 -.001 .000 -.001 
 (.001) (.150) (.002) (.002) 
Intercept .005** 4.135*** .020*** .018*** 
 (.002) (.266) (.003) (.003) 
     
Post * Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 1.71 12.52 5.52 10.40 
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 16,633 34,156 24,732 21,208 
Number of firms 3,927 7,073 5,242 4,512 







Table D4 – Difference-in-differences with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Excluding 
Observations from 2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Advertising Products Promotions Distribution 
Domestic market knowledge * Post * 
Liberalization .003 .317* .004** .003 
 (.002) (.187) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post * 
Liberalization .003 -.087 -.007** -.008** 
 (.003) (.308) (.003) (.003) 
Foreign market knowledge * 
Liberalization -.003 -.045 .004 .011*** 
 (.003) (.322) (.004) (.004) 
Domestic market knowledge * Post -.002 -.255* -.001 .000 
 (.001) (.143) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post -.001 .076 .004** .002 
 (.002) (.217) (.002) (.002) 
Post * Liberalization  -.002 .024 .001 -.000 
 (.002) (.164) (.002) (.002) 
Post .005** .737** -.004 .003 
 (.003) (.288) (.003) (.003) 
Foreign market knowledge .003 .508** .009*** .016*** 
 (.002) (.226) (.002) (.002) 
Firm size (*10-5) .003 159.000*** -.229 .020 
 (.110) (15.900) (.207) (.204) 
Firm profitability  .006*** -.016 .010*** .010*** 
 (.001) (.127) (.002) (.002) 
Domestic competition -.002 .070 .000 -.000 
 (.001) (.155) (.002) (.002) 
Intercept .007*** 4.234*** .020*** .016*** 
 (.002) (.266) (.003) (.003) 
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 2.54 33.83 17.96 37.14 
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 14,664 29,591 21,580 18,699 
Number of firms 3,640 6,610 4,840 4,221 




Table D5 – Difference-in-differences with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Excluding 
Observations from 1999 and 2000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Advertising Products Promotions Distribution 
Domestic market knowledge * Post * 
Liberalization .002 .275 .004* .002 
 (.002) (.187) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post * 
Liberalization .002 -.072 -.008** -.009** 
 (.002) (.315) (.003) (.003) 
Foreign market knowledge * Liberalization -.003 -.043 .004 .009** 
 (.003) (.333) (.004) (.004) 
Domestic market knowledge * Post -.001 -.237* -.001 .001 
 (.001) (.143) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post -.000 .138 .004* .004* 
 (.002) (.224) (.002) (.002) 
Post * Liberalization  -.002 .044 .002 -.000 
 (.001) (.165) (.002) (.002) 
Post .003 .712** -.004 .003 
 (.002) (.287) (.003) (.003) 
Foreign market knowledge .003 .458* .008*** .018*** 
 (.002) (.237) (.002) (.002) 
Firm size (*10-5) -.025 127.000*** -.351 -.042 
 (.123) (18.300) (.234) (.232) 
Firm profitability .007*** -.175 .009*** .009*** 
 (.001) (.142) (.002) (.002) 
Domestic competition -.000 -.062 .001 -.000 
 (.001) (.164) (.002) (.002) 
Intercept .006*** 4.382*** .019*** .015*** 
 (.002) (.266) (.003) (.003) 
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 2.92 19.75 15.17 35.38 
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 12,714 25,106 18,603 16,152 
Number of firms 3,420 6,078 4,472 3,909 





Table D6 – Difference-in-differences with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Winsorizing at 
0.5% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Advertising Products Promotions Distribution 
Domestic market knowledge * Post * 
Liberalization .003* .259 .004** .004* 
 (.002) (.177) (.002) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post * 
Liberalization .003 -.072 -.008** -.005 
 (.003) (.310) (.003) (.003) 
Foreign market knowledge * 
Liberalization -.004 -.120 .003 .010*** 
 (.003) (.320) (.004) (.004) 
Domestic market knowledge * Post -.002* -.209 -.001 -.000 
 (.001) (.136) (.001) (.002) 
Foreign market knowledge * Post -.001 .055 .004** .002 
 (.002) (.211) (.002) (.002) 
Post * Liberalization  -.003* .036 .002 -.001 
 (.001) (.157) (.002) (.002) 
Post .004* .766*** -.003 .003 
 (.002) (.273) (.003) (.003) 
Foreign market knowledge .003* .576*** .011*** .017*** 
 (.002) (.218) (.002) (.002) 
Firm size (*10-5) .030 185.000*** -.432** .013 
 (.120) (16.900) (.212) (.233) 
Firm profitability  .007*** .067 .010*** .011*** 
 (.001) (.119) (.002) (.002) 
Domestic competition -.000 .057 .000 -.001 
 (.001) (.143) (.002) (.002) 
Intercept .005** 4.065*** .019*** .016*** 
 (.002) (.253) (.003) (.003) 
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 3.35 44.16 23.15 45.8 
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 16,633 34,156 24,732 21,208 
Number of firms 3,927 7,073 5,242 4,512 





APPENDIX E: MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 






















       
Domestic market knowledge 
Distribution 1.602 .080 .258 .033 .11 29.98% 
       
Foreign market knowledge 
Promotions 1.692 .074 .258 .020 .11 18.38% 
Distribution 2.237 .080 .258 .029 .11 26.21% 
Note: The table calculates the improvements in incumbent firm profitability from a two standard deviations change in the relevant     
marketing response (increase or decrease) in the presence of two standard deviations increase in FDI competition and two standard 




APPENDIX F:  DETAILS OF SECTION 135, COMPANIES ACT 
Section 135 of the Companies Act requires every firm crossing the thresholds mentioned 
to constitute a Corporate Social Responsibility Committee of the Board consisting of three or 
more directors, out of which at least one director shall be an independent director. The CSR 
Committee shall formulate CSR activities, recommend the amount of expenditure to be incurred 
on the activities formulated, and monitor the CSR policy. The Board of every company should 
disclose the CSR policy in its annual report, and ensure that the activities included in the CSR 
policy are carried out by the company. 
While the Act does not indicate what activities constitute CSR spending, Schedule VII of 
the Companies Act, 2013 states that firms’ CSR activities should relate to, (i) eradicating 
extreme hunger and poverty; (ii) promotion of education; (iii) promoting gender equality and 
empowering women; (iv) reducing child mortality and improving maternal health; (v) combating 
HIV, AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (vi) ensuring environmental sustainability; (vii) 
employment-enhancing vocational skills; (viii) social business projects; (ix) contribution to the 
Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund or any other fund set up by the Central Government or the 
state governments for socioeconomic development, and relief and funds for the welfare of the 
scheduled castes, the scheduled tribes, other backward classes, minorities and women; and (x) 

















APPENDIX G:  DEFINITIONS OF FIRM CSR SPENDING FROM THE PROWESS DATABASE 
1. CSR Spending  
a. Donations – Donations made by companies are reported in this data field. 
These are not directly related to the day-to-day operations and are usually 
incurred for social causes. Some types of donations are – donation for a 
religious purpose, donation to a local authority or an institution set up for the 
purpose of a social cause, donation to an institution for the relief work because 
of destruction caused by a natural calamity, donation given to the Prime 
Minister’s National or Drought Relief Fund, donation to a political party. 
b. Social and community – These are the expenses incurred by companies for 
benefit of the society or community in general. They may be in the nature of 
expenses on building or maintaining public parks, garden maintenance, 
building temples, constructing roads or contributing for social occasions. 
c. Environment and pollution control related – Companies at times describe an 
expense as to control or reduce pollution caused during the manufacturing 




APPENDIX H:  ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
Table H1 – Control Function – First Stage Regression 




options Advertising R&D Distribution Promotions 
       
Industry average .504*** .447*** .116*** .363*** .182*** .059* 
 (.038) (.100) (.038) (.038) (.026) (.036) 
Intercept (*10-2) .021*** .037*** .445*** .108*** 1.03*** 1.19*** 
 (.002) (.004) (.014) (.004) (.025) (.039) 
       
Observations 11,944 11,485 11,987 11,987 11,987 11,987 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 177.45 5.4 2.32 25.82 9.6 8.34 
Prob>F .000 .000 .023 .000 .000 .000 



























Table H2 – Robustness Check – Dropping 5% of observations 
  Already-compliers First-time compliers 
CSR * Business group affiliation 
(*106) 3.687* 1.402 
 (2.136) (1.801) 
CSR * Employee stock options (*109) 1.474*** -.819* 
 (.481) (.433) 
CSR * Advertising (*108) 1.611*** .911** 
 (.563) (.437) 
CSR * R&D (*108) 3.818* 4.135** 
 (2.013) (1.824) 
CSR * Distribution (*107) 1.074 2.825 
 (4.328) (3.554) 
CSR * Promotions (*107) 1.595 -5.226** 
 (2.758) (2.471) 
Controls   
CSR (*106) 4.288 -1.533 
 (10.380) (7.318) 
Employee stock options (*107) 3.797*** .831 
 (1.363) (.863) 
Advertising (*106) -5.717 5.241 
 (5.905) (4.370) 
R&D (*106) 13.860* 14.320*** 
 (7.371) (4.491) 
Distribution (*106) 2.357 2.888* 
 (2.307) (1.744) 
Promotions  (*106) 13.000* 4.993 
 (7.627) (4.070) 
Firm size (*105) .126** .138*** 
 (.062) (.047) 
Firm profitability (*105) .376 .578*** 
 (.236) (.156) 
Firm sales growth (*104) .624*** .044 
 (.174) (.082) 
Residuals from first stage   
CSR (*106) -7.743 .494 
 (10.230) (7.270) 
Employee stock options (*107) -3.831*** -.898 
 (1.364) (.861) 
Advertising (*106) 5.735 -4.917 
 (5.912) (4.381) 
R&D (*107) -1.510** -1.494*** 
 (.729) (.446) 
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Table H2 continued 
Distribution (*106) -2.200 -2.749 
 (2.303) (1.738) 
Promotions (*107) -1.305* -.508 
 (.762) (.406) 
Intercept (*106) -.257*** -.235*** 
 (.093) (.061) 
   
Observations 2,004 2,006 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
F-statistic 9.25 8.15 
Prob>F .000 .000 

































Table H3 – Mandatory CSR Spending and Shareholder Value – 2 Digit Industry First Stage 
Controls 
  Already-compliers First-time compliers 
CSR * Business group affiliation (*106)  4.097** 2.064 
 (2.076) (1.641) 
CSR * Employee stock options (*108) 10.740** -6.961* 
 (4.777) (4.208) 
CSR * Advertising (*108) 1.624*** .681* 
 (.554) (.406) 
CSR * R&D (*108) 4.244** 3.182** 
 (1.957) (1.578) 
CSR * Distribution (*107) 2.157 2.846 
 (4.187) (3.239) 
CSR * Promotions (*107) 3.852 -4.757** 
 (2.660) (2.351) 
Controls   
CSR (*106) 7.670 1.725 
 (9.428) (6.378) 
Employee stock options (*107) 1.944** .601 
 (.898) (.589) 
Advertising (*106) -1.410 -.266 
 (3.328) (2.520) 
R&D (*106) 7.607 14.380*** 
 (6.873) (4.516) 
Distribution (*106) 3.216* 4.965*** 
 (1.897) (1.470) 
Promotions (*106) 9.962 5.870 
 (10.490) (5.872) 
Firm size (*105) .134** .125*** 
 (.061) (.044) 
Firm profitability (*105) .322 .571*** 
 (.225) (.147) 
Firm sales growth (*104) .612*** .031 
 (.172) (.075) 
Residuals from first stage   
CSR (*107) -1.188 -.275 
 (.935) (.626) 
Employee stock options (*106) -19.370** -6.624 
 (8.963) (5.867) 
Advertising (*106) 1.327 .591 
 (3.320) (2.535) 
R&D (*106) -9.136 -14.93*** 
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Table H3 continued 
 (6.829) (4.505) 
Distribution (*106) -3.035 -4.744*** 
 (1.893) (1.462) 
Promotions (*107) -1.011 -.596 
 (1.047) (.586) 
Intercept (*106) -.244** -.234*** 
 (.119) (.072) 
   
Observations 2,102 2,116 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
F-statistic 9.61 8.45 
Prob>F .000 .000 

































Table H4 – Robustness Checks – Controls included in the First Stage 
  Already-compliers First-time compliers 
CSR * Business group affiliation 
(*106) 3.652* 1.970 
 (2.076) (1.635) 
CSR * Employee stock options (*108) 12.33*** -7.410* 
 (4.748) (4.140) 
CSR * Advertising (*108) 1.835*** .822** 
 (.551) (.397) 
CSR * R&D (*108) 3.869* 3.307** 
 (1.976) (1.568) 
CSR * Distribution (*107) 1.815 2.773 
 (4.217) (3.221) 
CSR * Promotions (*107) 3.128 -5.328** 
 (2.688) (2.341) 
Controls   
CSR (*106) .268 -.381 
 (10.43) (7.212) 
Employee stock options (*107) 4.437*** .838 
 (1.503) (.901) 
Advertising (*106) -4.578 3.263 
 (4.864) (3.536) 
R&D (*107) 1.385* 1.520*** 
 (.765) (.453) 
Distribution (*106) 3.725 5.158** 
 (3.297) (2.419) 
Promotions (*107) 2.273* 1.024 
 (1.284) (.653) 
Firm size (*105) .743*** .607*** 
 (.247) (.146) 
Firm profitability (*106) -.397** -.215** 
 (.185) (.097) 
Firm sales growth (*104) .597*** .127 
 (.183) (.915) 
Residuals from first stage    
CSR (*106) -4.214 -.684 
 (10.31) (7.164) 
Employee stock options (*107) -4.434*** -.895 
 (1.504) (.901) 
Advertising (*106) 4.500 -2.965 





Table H4 continued 
R&D (*107) -1.545** -1.579*** 
 (.757) (.452) 
Distribution (*106) -3.547 -4.976** 
 (3.295) (2.416) 
Promotions (*107) -2.287* -1.030 
 (1.284) (.653) 
Intercept (*106) -.995*** -.777*** 
 (.358) (.203) 
   
Observations 2,110 2,125 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
F-statistic 9.96 8.57 
Prob>F .000 .000 
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